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INTRODUCTION

In a not-so-distant past, the U.S. Supreme Court displayed a remarkable unwillingness to monitor matters political. This is no longer
the case. The change in judicial posture began in earnest in the early
1960s, with the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr' Bakers demands
were very modest; only egregious circumstances, as then seen
throughout the country, warranted judicial intervention.2 All too
soon, however, passive regulation of the political thicket gave way to
judicial control of reapportionment questions. This institutional shift
began almost immediately after the Court imposed an equipopulation
standard in Reynolds v. Sims. 3 In the words of the late Professor Dixon,
written at the time of Reynolds, "[C]ourts not only have entered the
thicket, they occupy it."M Today, it is fair to say that judicial involvement in democratic politics is a common thread weaved into the
5
fabric of our political culture.
1 369 U.S. 186, 187 (1962).
2 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker's Promise, EqualProtection, and the Modern Redistricting Revolution: A Plea For Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1353, 1354-60 (2002).
3 377 U.S. 533, 537 (1964); see Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Court, the People, and
"One Man, One Vote", in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970s, at 7, 11 (Nelson W. Polsby
ed., 1971).
4 Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional Struggle for FairRepresentation, 63 MICH. L. REv. 209, 210 (1964); see also Michael
A. Fitts, The Hazardsof Legal Fine Tuning: Confronting the Free Will Problem in Election Law
Scholarship,32 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1121, 1121 (1999) ("Far more than was ever imaginable several decades ago, litigants are asking the judicial process to draw the permissible limits of political activity."); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of PoliticalCompetition, 85
VA. L. REv. 1605, 1606 (1999) ("In the relatively short time since [Baker], the United
States Supreme Court has not only entered the 'political thicket,' but with remarkable
speed has found conflicts of democratic politics coming to dominate its docket.").
5 See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the PoliticalQuestion
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 239-41 (2002).
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This change in judicial posture towards redistricting questionsthough misguided in certain respects-reflects a worthy goal. Prior to
its intervention in Baker, the Court adhered to a formalistic understanding of the franchise. At that time, the relevant constitutional
question focused on the act of voting, not its weight or meaning.
Baker and Reynolds changed all that; these cases may be understood as
seeking to shift the focus on the franchise as a measure of acquiring
full and effective representation as opposed to a measure for merely
registering electoral preferences. 6 On these terms, the Court must be
commended for recognizing that voting is more than formalistic
exercise.
This new recognition of the franchise opened up very promising
lines of inquiry into the notion of full and effective participation. And
yet, the Court may be credited for identifying the question of representation but very little else.7 For all its promise and early jurisprudential efforts, the Court was never able to convey sensibly what
exactly this new focus on representation and participation meant. A
satisfying answer notwithstanding, the Court continued to limit the
legitimate discretion of state actors while dealing with pressing questions of democratic rights. Worse yet, it may be said that the Court
ultimately proved to be too successful, too confident, and ultimately
too cavalier in its handling of political matters. Those who wished for
a manageable standard got exactly that, the formalistic and mechanical "one person, one vote." As a consequence of this failure, we now
have a judiciary too willing to thrust itself into policy debates. 8
This Article responds to this state of affairs, a state amply reflected in modern voting rights law. In so doing, it argues that the
6 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565 (explaining that political fairness may be loosely defined as "the achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens").
7 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not by "Election Law" Alone, 32 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 1173, 1180 (1999) ("The Court could identify 'full and effective' participation as a goal, but the decisions did little to elucidate this idea."). This was the basis
ofJustice Harlan's persistent complaints through the years. See Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at
589 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 330 (1962) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
8 Rick Pildes labels this new judicial posture the "constitutionalization of democracy." Richard H. Pildes, ConstitutionalizingDemocratic Politics, in A BADLY FLAWED
ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

155 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002). As he argues, "the Court now almost reflexively acts
as if it were appropriate for constitutional law always to provide ready answers as to
what makes democracy 'best."' Id. at 156. This is problematic, he continues, because
the Court no longer asks "whether there are appropriate reasons that democratic
politics itself is not the proper forum in which to address those questions." Id.
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Court should play a passive, minimalist role, a position that would afford the relevant political actors the needed space to carry out their
policymaking duties as necessary. 9 Three premises ground the discussion throughout. First, the Court has made clear that the redistricting
task belongs to the states. 0 Second, the redistricting process raises
difficult and contested questions of politics and democratic theory.
And third, debates over redistricting choices at the state level are really debates over the concept of "fair representation," debates that are
inherently complex and ultimately not amenable to judicial
resolution.
These premises in mind, how must the Supreme Court understand and approach matters of electoral politics, and particularly cases
involving racial and political gerrymandering? Many observers contend that the Court must retain a strong presence in the gerrymandering thicket while policing its contours aggressively." This Article
9 To be clear, this Article does not stake a states' rights position. The question of
whether voting rights law has cut too deep into matters of state sovereignty remains
wholly outside the scope of this Article. Many commentators make precisely this
point, to be sure. See, e.g.,
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 193-200
(1980) (Powell,J., dissenting); id. at 206-21 (RehnquistJ., dissenting); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 671 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Melissa L. Saunders, The
Dirty Little Secrets of Shaw, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 141, 147-48 (2000) (asserting
that the Shaw line of cases "reflect[s] a callous disregard-indeed, utter contemptfor the autonomy of the states' political processes, a disregard that cannot be squared
with basic principles of federalism and democratic self-government"). This Article is
focused instead on our structural commitments as reflected in established electoral
practices. To put this point a different way, the challenge is to find a space between
Justice Frankfurter's absolutist "political questions" regime and the aggressive review
we have come to experience.
10 See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1993); Growe v. Emison,
507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 19 (1975); see also Bush v. Vera,
517 U.S. 952, 978 (1996) (recognizing the Court's "longstanding recognition of the
importance in our federal system of each State's sovereign interest in implementing
its redistricting plan"). The Court holds on to this view even in the face of contradictory signals sent in the wake of Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and its progeny. See
Vera v. Bush, 517 U.S. 952, 978 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915-16
(1995). But see Miller, 515 U.S. at 949 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Court's disposition renders districting perilous work for state legislatures .... Genuine attention

to traditional districting practices and avoidance of bizarre configurations seemed,
tinder Shaw, to provide a safe harbor . . . . In view of today's decision, that is no
longer the case." (citations omitted)); Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 S'AN. L. REV. 731, 753 (1998) ("Although the courts
pay great lip service to the idea that reapportionment is a core state function whose
inherently political nature 'requires courts to exercise extraordinary caution' before
intervening, the reality seems to belie their protestations." (citation omitted)).
11 SeeJohn Hart Ely, Gerrymanders:the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L. REv.
607, 607-11 (1998); Robinson 0. Everett, Redistricting in North Carolina-A Personal
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disagrees. In a nutshell, this Article argues that the gerrymandering
debate is really a debate about the difficult concept of representation. 12 At the heart of most criticisms lies the view that gerry-

mandered districts are tainted districts, a skewed representative
measure of the constituency in question. On these terms, however,
the better question is an institutional one: would we gain a tangible
measure of electoral representation qua individual districts were the
Court to aggressively monitor the crafting of electoral districts? Put a
different way: would the judicial cleansing of gerrymandered districts
lead to gains in terms of electoral representation? As this Article
makes amply clear, answers to these questions are not as clear-cut as
one might expect.
This Article develops this position over the course of four Parts.
Part I makes three particular points. First, under a single-member districting system, the concept of representation must focus on the question of representation at the district level. In so doing, critics of the
gerrymander must shift their attention away from the larger jurisdiction, whether state or national politics, and towards the dynamics
found within each particular district. Second, critics often decry gerrymandered districts because representatives elected from such districts are thought to be less accountable and less responsive than
representatives from non-gerrymandered districts. This Part disputes
these simplistic characterizations. 13 It concludes that the concept of
fair representation under present districting practices fares surprisingly well.
The third point may be considered the heart of the Article. As
matters stand, existing electoral structures provide a very strong incentive to gerrymander. Yet, once the relevant institutions behave as expected, we cry foul while wishing to enlist the Court's help to cleanse
Perspective, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1301, 1304-06 (2001); Samuel Issacharoff, Genymandering
and PoliticalCartels, 116 HARv. L. REv. (forthcoming 2002); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard Pildes, No Placefor PoliticalGeoymandering, TEX. LAw., Aug. 5, 1996, at 25; see also
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of CampaignFinance Reform, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1705 (1999) ("Electoral reform is a graveyard of well-intentioned
plans gone awry ....

Consider a few simple examples. The Supreme Court finally

broke the lockhold of the self-interested refusal to redistrict in the landmark Baker
and Reynolds decisions. Three decades later, however, the political gerrymander is
not only alive and well; it has assumed the role of an institutionalized industry that
seems largely immune from substantive review." (citations omitted)).
12 See, e.g., HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THlE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 209-40
(1967) (analyzing various theories of political representation).
13 For a similar argument, see Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding
Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116
HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002).
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the political system of the very outcomes we must expect from present
electoral arrangements. As part of this argument, this Part remains
agnostic about the redistricting process as it presently stands. The
more important question focuses on the Court's proper role in these
matters. Rather than wishing for aggressive judicial intervention, dissatisfaction with the redistricting process must lead to changes in our
electoral structures. 14 In light of all that we know about the Court's
role in the redistricting thicket and particularly its behavior in recent
years, this Part concludes that the Court is not the proper instigator of
change.
The remainder of the Article counsels for a minimalist judicial
approach to both racial and political gerrymandering questions. Part
II focuses on the appropriate judicial response to the political gerrymander. This Part argues that the Court must safeguard the outer
boundaries of the political process, those areas last seen in the infamous malapportioned districts of the 1960s. Short of those egregious
facts, the Court must play a passive role. More specifically, this Part
joins those who wish for a better process, one where the relevant actors behave as prudent civil servants, always conscious and respectful
of their moral duties and willing to place the public interest ahead of
their own. This is not a fitting description of the world we live in, to
put it mildly.1 5 As such, the better question looks to how courts must
respond to the realities of the political world once we agree that redistricting duties are appropriately entrusted to state legislatures. To
date, the Court has played a passive role in political gerrymandering
cases, focusing on those rare moments when majorities lock out mi14 Professors Issacharoff and Pildes complain that "[iun the American context, no
deliberative decision was made to choose [single-member electoral districting] over
[proportional representation], and one cannot say that, as an original matter, American electoral structures were designed to limit competition to two dominant parties."
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:PartisanLockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643, 677 (1998). This Article does not take issue with
this view. My more general point is that, reasons for its implementation aside, we

have designed the political structures of our democracy in a way we have enjoyed for
well over a century. To ask the Court to reform this system, as critics of the gerrymander implicitly ask, is far more simple than doing the hard, yet requisite, work of reforming the system through established political means. For such critics, see DavidJ.
Garrow, Ruining the House, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2002, at A29; and Samuel Issacharoff,
In Real Elections, There Ought To Be Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2002, at A19.

15

SeeJames A. Gardner, Can Party Politics Be Virtuous?, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 667,

701 (2000) ("[I]t seems clear that a politics of virtue carried on through political
parties is likely to be an extremely fragile enterprise."); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest
Thicket: Partisan Gerrymanderingand Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REv.
1325, 1325-30 (1987).
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norities in perpetuity. 16 This Part defends the Court's approach to
political gerrymandering.
Part III examines the racial gerrymander. It argues that the modem racial gerrymanders are a subspecies of the political gerrymander. 17 Thus, this Part also counsels for a passive judicial role in Shawlike cases.1 8 Finally, Part IV, by way of a conclusion, contends that the
courts must analyze all redistricting plans carefully, deferentially, and
respectfully. While it does not advocate a return to the political questions regime of pre-Baker v. Carr, this Part argues that cases fit for
judicial intervention will be few and far between.' 9
I.

ON THE MATTER OF REPRESENTATION AND THE
GERRYMANDERING QUESTION

The hated gerrymander is under siege. Commentators are unanimous in their condemnation of the practice. For example, Martin
Shapiro wrote over a decade ago that "f[g] errymandering is a bad, bad
thing."20 The gerrymander is said to "corrupt politics," 2' for, in its
16

This formulation acknowledges the difference between lockups, which serve to

disadvantage minor parties, and lockouts, which shut them out of the process altogether. See Bruce E. Cain, Garrett's Temptation, 85 VA. L. Rv. 1589, 1601 (1999).
17 See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 234-37 (2001); Guy-Uriel E. Charles &
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to Racial Redistricting in the New Millennium: Hunt v.
Cromartie as a Case Study, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 227, 300-10 (2001).
18 See Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in ConstitutionalLaw: Lessons for Getting the
Least DangerousBranch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REv. 667, 674 (2002) (exploring ways by which the Court may "extricate itself from the tangle it has created in
the Shaw cases").
19 Cf Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 761 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (exhorting judicial intervention in redistricting controversies only for egregious cases);
id. at 754 (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that the standard he advocates would
pose a burden "that plaintiffs can meet in relatively few cases"); Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 859 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the burden which plaintiffs must overcome is a severe one); id. at 860 (Stevens,J., dissenting)
("I do not suggest at facts as extraordinary as those alleged in Gomillion are necessarily
required, but I am persuaded that if compliance with the standard of population
equality is present, judicial intervention is not warranted unless the facts dramatically
and convincingly foreclose any permissible construction of the legislature's work." (citations omitted)).
20 Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L.
REv. 227, 251 (1985); see ROBERT B. McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS
OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 229, 255 (1965); David Wells, Against Affirmative Gerrymandering, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTIC-TING ISSUES 85-86 (Bernard Grofman et al.
eds., 1982). But see Bruce E. Cain, Simple vs. Complex Criteriafor PartisanGerrymandering: A Comment on Niemi and Grofman, 33 UCLA L. REv. 213, 226 (1985) (arguing that
partisan plans are the real evils in need of eradication, and that a partisan gerryman-

der, while a nuisance, is not "the great evil it is portrayed to be").
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worst form, it "condemns political groups to permanent minority status almost regardless of their electoral strength or of changes in voter
preferences." 2 2 More generally, yet just as significantly, Backstrom
and his colleagues argue that "[n]o one can seriously defend gerrymandering. '23 They are not alone.
At their core, these criticisms worry about the question of "fair
representation," the very question found at the heart of much of our
modern voting rights law. The Voting Rights Act, for example, focuses on the "opportunity ... to participate in the political process

and to elect representatives of their choice." 24 Similarly, the genesis
of the redistricting revolution may be traced to the Court's struggle
with this question. These two examples are quite telling in one crucial
respect. In both the post-1982 Voting Rights Act cases and the redistricting battles post-Baker, the Supreme Court has played an aggressive
role in policing the contours of the political process. Put another way,
the Court has played a central role in our enduring quest for a working definition for the concept of "fair representation."
This is a misguided judicial posture. This Part presses this point
over the course of two Sections. The first Section highlights the political aspects of the redistricting process. It also focuses on the singlemember character of our structure of representation. Taken together, these two positions cast heavy pressure on those who advocate
for aggressive court intervention. The second Section argues similarly
that modern redistricting practices address the question of "fair representation" quite well. More specifically, it contends that gerrymandering practices are both unsurprising and democratically healthy, in
terms of electoral representation. Taken together, these Sections respond to the many critics who assail the political gerrymander. Upon
inspection, the practice may be far less noxious than generally
presumed.
A.

Welcome to the Thicket: Redistricting and Politics

This first Section contends that recurring judicial interventions in
the longstanding debate over "fair representation" are generally unwise. Two general premises lead me to this view. First, the redistrict21 Christopher L. Eisgruber, Ethnic Segregation by Religion and Race: Reflections on
Kiryas Joel and Shaw v. Reno, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 515, 525 (1995-1996).
22 Bernard Grofman, Toward a Coherent Theory of Gerrymandering: Bandemer and
Thornburg, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 29, 62 n.34 (Bernard

Grofman ed., 1990).
23 Charles Backstrom et al., Establishinga Statewide Electoral Effects Baseline, in PoLIeICAL GERRYMANDERING AND TilE COURTS, supra note 22, at 145, 165.
24 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
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ing process as presently structured involves matters of the utmost
partisan and ideological nature. In choosing sides, the intervening
court will of necessity side with one party over another as the question
of representation recedes to the background. 25 From afar, we may
describe the debate as one over fair representation, yet, upon closer
inspection, it is clear that this particular question is far from anyone's
mind.26

Second, our general preference for single-member districts
places grave demands on critics of the gerrymander. In carving up a
large jurisdiction into smaller districts, the locus of representation
shifts inward, towards each smaller jurisdiction. For this reason, general critiques of a redistricting plan are often inadequate; far more
important is the question of representation within each particular district. This insight, coupled with our professed affection for a strong
two-party system, leads to the creation of gerrymandered districts.
Thus the question at the heart of this Article: what role should federal
courts play in such a process? This Section takes up each argument in
turn.

25 SeeJ. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGH-TS AND
THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 426-39 (1999); Heather K. Gerken,
Morgan Kousser's Noble Dream, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1298, 1326-31 (2001) (reviewing
supra); Saunders, supra note 9, at 146 (contending that districting plans "are
being tied up in litigation for years-litigation whose outcome seems to depend on
little more than the personal political predilections of the particular federal judges
who happen to be assigned to the case"). It is precisely for this reason that courts
gravitate towards clear, hard rules. See Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at
War with Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1517,1520
(2002) ("[I] n cases involving the raw distribution of political power, courts are particularly drawn to bright-line, formal rules precisely because rules of this sort might mitiKOUSSER,

gate the tension between a necessaryjudicial role in this area and the risk that courts
will appear to be partisan players in the most political act of all: designing representative institutions and allocating political power."); cf Roy A. Schotland, The Limits of
Being "Present at the Creation", 80 N.C. L. REV. 1505, 1515 (2002). Schotland argues,
Standards are essential for all judicial action, although if we decide obscenity
cases with analysis like "I know it when I see it," we do not jeopardize the
judiciary. In contrast, ifjudicial review of districting suffers standardless subjectivity, there is danger that subjectivity degenerates to partisan preference;
and if the courts are in fact or are justifiably seen as partisan, then their
ability to perform their highest role is endangered.
Id.
26 See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71
L. REv. 1705, 1733-35 (1993).

TEX.
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1. The Politics of Redistricting
Anyone wishing to witness a political clash of the highest order
need only attend a state redistricting session. The examples are many,
and, in hindsight, all of them quite amusing. In Illinois after the 1980
census, for example, State Senator Mark Rhoads thought he had the
votes to pass his party's preferred redistricting plan. Using parliamentary tactics to his advantage, however, Senator Philip Rock managed to
delay a vote on the plan. Senator Rhoads became outraged and attempted to charge the podium to reach Senator Rock. Before he
could reach him, however, Senator Sam Vadalabene intervened and
punched Senator Rhoads in the jaw. An eyewitness commented that
"for a moment it looked as though both benches were going to
empty."27 With the television cameras rolling, the adversaries were
pulled apart. In the end, quite predictably, the process ended up in
28
deadlock.
This is a typical example of the tensions inherent in the redistricting process. 29 The claim is fairly undisputed: redistricting has intensely partisan qualities. 30 Compounding matters, this is also a
process with an implicit zero-sum, win-lose quality. Put another way, it
is impossible to carve out districts in a politically "neutral" way.3 1 No
matter which way we slice a given jurisdiction, neutral lines simply do
not and will not exist; any one line drawn in any given place will

benefit one party, hinder the other.3 2 This reality is inherent to any
27 See Paul M. Green, Legislative Redistrictingin Illinois 1871-1982: A Study of GeoPoliticalSurvival, in REDISTRICrING: AN EXERCISE IN PROPHECY 32-33 (AnnaJ. Merritt
ed., 1982).
28 Id. at 33.
29 See Andrew Gelman & Gary King, EnhancingDemocracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 541, 541 (1994).
30 See Richard Prez-Peiia, With 2 Congressional Seats Lost, Albany Begins Battling
Over Who Must Go, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, at B1 ("[Redistricting] is as nakedly political and partisan an exercise as this highly politicized Capitol has to offer. It is about
alliances and rewards, about scraping for every advantage for yourself and your party,
about staying alive.").
31 This is not to say that redistricting is an evil in and of itself. The opposite is
true. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 128 (1986) ("The very essence of districting is to produce a different-a more 'politically fair'-result than would be reached
with elections at large, in which the winning party would take 100% of the legislative
seats.").
32 See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) ("District lines are rarely
neutral phenomena. They can well determine what district will be predominantly
Democratic or predominantly Republican, or make a close race likely."); see also
Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural
Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering,9 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 301, 310 (1991)
("Every districting method helps someone at least to the extent of hurting someone
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redistricting model under a two-party system. This is precisely what
Robert Dixon had in mind when he wrote that all redistricting is
33
gerrymandering.
From this perspective, the real inquiry looks to how those public
officials in charge of redistricting should perform this most political
task. Some might expect these legislators to behave like conscientious
public servants, elevating the public good ahead of their own. One
may also ask, quite sensibly, that these legislative bodies pay close attention to the difficult question of "fair representation" thrust to the
forefront by Reynolds. All the relevant evidence points to the view that
these expectations are clearly unwarranted. When it comes to redistricting, self-interest displaces civic-mindedness as the impetus behind
the enacted plans. This should not be surprising, especially in light of
the previous conclusions over the inherent impossibility of crafting
neutral lines and their concomitant partisan effect.
A cursory look at the process demonstrates that the relevant political actors understand the process exactly this way. The politics are
played across two reinforcing planes. On one plane are the state legislators, the actors charged with the initial task of drafting redistricting
legislation. This plane is political in its purest form, as the earlier example intimated.34 The second plane finds all federal actors, from
officials at the Department of Justice (DOJ) to federal judges invited
into the thicket through the Fourteenth Amendment by Baker v.
Carr. 3 5 These actors are less consciously political, for their duties arise
from both statutory and constitutional demands. This is not to say
that political considerations are completely removed from this plane;
the reality is far from it. During the 1990 redistricting round, to describe a well-known example, DOJ discharged its section 5 duties with
a vengeance, asking covered jurisdictions to maximize the creation of
else."). Robert Bork's adventures in redistricting are illustrative in this context. To

be sure, nobody will ever accuse Judge Bork of harboring a pro-Democratic bias. And
yet, when called upon while a professor at Yale Law School to act as a special master to
carve the state of Connecticut into districts, his final plan so benefited the Democratic
party that its chairman specially congratulated him. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPT88-89 (1990); Robert G.
Dixon, Jr., FairCriteriaand Proceduresfor EstablishingLegislative Districts, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES, supra note 20, at 7, 18-19.
ING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw

33
LAW

See ROBERT
AND

G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN

POLITICS

462 (1968) (stating that in a functional sense "districting is

gerrymandering").
34 See David E. Rosenbaum, As Redistricting Unfolds, Power Is Used To Get More of It,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at A14 (documenting political stakes in redistricting battles

post 2000 census).
35 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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majority-minority districts whenever possible.3 6 This is precisely the
situation that gave rise to Shaw v. Reno. 3 7 Some commentators attribute the 1994 Republican capture of the House of Representatives
38
precisely to this strategy.
This Section argues that both of these planes are clear expressions of political will, as the parties seek to gain an enduring advantage for the following decade. But there is more. Up until 1961, the
federal bench was cordoned off to partisans wishing to challenge state
redistricting plans. Baker v. Carr changed that,3 9 of course, yet this
intervention was well-warranted, for circumstances in many states were
quite egregious, what may be described as a political lock-up. 40 Such
is not the case any longer, once the Court established the one person,
one vote principle in Reynolds v. Sims.4 1 Thus the question: should the
courts play this central role any longer?
To my mind, the answer is no. When courts intervene, they simply take sides in highly politicized debates. They do very little else.
The relevant actors know this, of course, and for this reason those who
lose at the legislative level are always ready to challenge the enacted
plan in state and federal court, depending on where they expect to
find a more receptive partisan audience. This is now a decennial occurrence; just this past redistricting round, examples may be gleaned
by looking to California, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey,
North Carolina, and Texas, to name a few. At the heart of this Article
stands the proposition that judicial intervention in redistricting matters should not be so aggressive.
36 See MAURICE T. CUNNINGHAM, MAXIMIZATION, WHATEVER THE COST: RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1-11 (2001); MARK S. MONMONIER,
BUSHMANDERS AND BULLWINKLES: HOW POLITICIANS MANIPULATE ELECTRONIC MAPS AND
CENSUS DATA

To

WIN ELECTIONS

121-35 (2001); Pildes, supra note 25, at 1558-59

(discussing the use of section 5 for partisan reasons). But see Bernard Grofman,
Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: "When It Comes to Redistricting,
Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing", 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237, 1254 (1993)
("[T]he claim that a Republican-controlled DOJ has been enforcing the Voting

Rights Act in a selective and partisan manner is simply not supported by the evidence
from 1990s redistricting.").
37 509 U.S. 630, 645 (1993).
38 For the debate surrounding this particular point, see DAVID T. CANON, RACE,
REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITy DISTRICTS 75-77 (1999); DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 110-14 (1997).

39

See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 258-59 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring).

40

Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 14, at 644-52.

41

377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).
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Fair Representation and Single-Member Districts

The second argument is both complex and contested. Put simply, our preference for single-member districting places much stress
on criticisms of political gerrymandering. In pursuing this claim, this
Section focuses its attention on the widely held norms of political
equality, responsiveness and representation. As part of this argument,
this Section contends that the Court has spilled much ink while in
pursuit of its goal of political equality, yet has done so without properly considering the question of fair representation. Curiously, this is
the question at the heart of the Court's redistricting mission.
This argument begins by looking to our time-honored practice of
single-member districting. In turning to this electoral method, we
send a clear signal about our views over the concept of representation.
We signal our commitment to representation at the district level; representatives do not represent the state but their constituents, those
who reside within their district. 42 As a result, when drawing lines, one
must look to the individual and her choices in the given election. In
so doing, it is clear that a majority of voters are always satisfied, for
they always vote*for the winning candidate. How then to argue that
redistricting is ever unfair to any individual voter, even in egregiously
gerrymandered districts? More specifically, why look at the entire jurisdiction at all when measuring the representational caliber of the
districting plan? When looking to the general vote count, objections
and criticisms often arise. And yet, why look there?
Two responses come to mind. First, this focus on the general
vote count places great stress on theories of representation, as it shifts
the locus of authority and legitimacy from the individual constituency
to the general jurisdiction, in clear tension with our commitment to
single-member districting. In order to see this point more clearly, one
need only take a cursory glance at the establishment of single-member
districting in the nineteenth century and the reasons for their implementation. The larger goal then was one of fair representation, a goal
that an at-large system had difficulties in carrying out. The at-large
system became particularly problematic once party allegiances came
into being, for one party with a majority of voters within a state could
42 This is not to say, to be clear, that Congress never responds as a collective body
to national trends, because "relatively minor adjustments in the congressional electorate can, because of the aggregative effects of the single-member district system, pro-

duce a dramatic shift in behavior at the institutional level." Melissa P. Collie &John
Lyman Mason, The Electoral Connection Between Party and Constituency Reconsidered: Evi-

dence from the U.S. House of Representatives, 1972-1994, in CONTINUITY
HOUSE ELECTIONS 211, 231 (David W. Brady et al. eds., 2000).

AND CHANGE IN

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 78:2

control an entire congressional delegation. 43 In this vein, the singlemember districting system may be seen as embodying a theory of democratic politics whereby power is diffused and majoritarian domination is fragmented across the larger jurisdiction. 44 In doing so,
representation becomes a crucial matter at the district level. This is
another way of reinforcing the earlier point: it is the constituents
within the district that matter, not the state as a whole.
Second, looking from the district to the state as a whole faces a
strong empirical obstacle. As it is generally made, the point is that
gerrymandering distorts the political process and ultimately biases the
system towards one party or the other. This point must be true for the
gerrymandering claim to have any bite; after all, if gerrymanderers
distort district lines to their hearts' content, yet the system is ultimately unbiased towards one party or another, the effect of the gerrymander on policymaking would be negligible, if existent at all. In
other words, the intent to gerrymander must be followed by political
advantages in the larger legislative body. Otherwise, why worry? As it
happens, researchers conclude that these lines exhibit minimal
45
amounts of partisan bias, if any at all.
One may respond to this line of argument by professing affection
to Reynolds v. Sims and the individual right to vote. 46 This response
does not help much, for two reasons. First, turning to Reynolds signals
a commitment to the individual and away from the group as the locus
of political authority. This move is problematic in many ways. To begin, the context here is redistricting, an arena where the notion of
individual rights takes a backseat to what a leading scholar in the field
has termed "aggregate rights. ' 4 7 As such, those who speak of individual rights in this context must do a lot more than simply assert the
moniker of Reynolds and expect their opponents to go on the defensive. In fairness, one may try to bolster their claim; after all, the "one
person, one vote" revolution is commonly understood as embracing a
moral electoral imperative. 48 The claim still falls short. Surely the
43

See Richard H. Pildes, Diffusion of Political Power and the Voting Rights Act, 24
123-24 (2000).
See id. at 124.

HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119,

44
45

See

DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE

(1992); Gelman & King, supra note 29, at 542.
Reynolds, 337 U.S. at 558.
See Heather K. Gerken, Understandingthe Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 1663, 1665 (2001); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right To Vote, 44

AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTVES 32

46
47

EMORY L.J. 869, 886-87 (1995).
48 See, e.g., Bernard Grofman & Howard A. Scarrow, Current Issues in Reapportionment, 4 LAW & POL'V Q. 435, 439 (1982) ("[T]he doctrine of 'one person, one vote'
has been elevated to the status of moral platitude."); see also Robert G. Dixon,Jr., The
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point cannot be that all votes must count equally within a given dis-

tricting plan. Redistricting is a zero-sum game, a condition that the
utmost care may not overcome. Thus, even the most careful of redistricters will have to place individuals in some districts where the votes
will be insignificant. Further, what to make of the curious ways in
which we withhold the franchise from many groups for very questionable reasons? 49 Finally, census imperfections and the choice of figures
upon which to base compliance with Reynolds and its progeny render
50
this argument ultimately unpersuasive.
Second, the method by which critics choose to attack gerrymandered plans is curious at best. On the one hand, the Reynolds
claim focuses on the right to vote and its individualistic quality. And
yet, the traditional move looks to the figures from the general jurisdiction in order to show discrimination. This makes little sense. A subsequent Section will press this claim in much more detail, particularly
51
the conventional use of the seat/votes ratio.
This move to Reynolds raises a much more important inquiry. To
wit: what to make of our general quest for fair representation? Seen
through the lens provided by Reynolds, what does the doctrinal turn to
strict population equality signal in terms of political representation?
Put yet another way, what does the Court's position tell us about its
normative conception of the right to vote and political representation? A leading answer to this question points to the concept of political equality. More specifically, the use of single-member districting,
coupled with the one person, one vote standard, leads to a view of
political equality.5

2

It may lead to a strong or weak view of equality,

depending on the degree to which the Court chooses to enforce its
equipopulation mandate. The Court's approach is as follows.
In the congressional districting area, equality is applied quite
strictly. The leading case is Karcher v. Daggett,where the Court invalidated a New Jersey redistricting plan with a maximum deviation of
0.6984% in favor of a plan with a smaller deviation.5 3 Of note, the
Warren Court Crusadefor the Holy Grail of "One Man-One Vote", 1969 SuP. CT. REV. 219,
268 ("'One man-one vote' should be perceived as the symbol of an aspiration for

fairness, for avoidance of complexity, for intelligibility in our representational process-indeed, for a sense of meaningful membership in the polis.").
49 See Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80
N.C. L. REv. 1269, 1269-80 (2002).
50 See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1966); Nathaniel Persily, The Right
To Be Counted, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1079 (2001) (reviewing PETER SKERRY, COUNTING
ON THE CENSUS? RACE, GROUP IDENTITY, AND THE EVASION OF POLITCS (2000)).
51 See infra Part II.B.1.
52 See BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 45, at 68. But see id. at 57, 69.
53 462 U.S. 725, 728-31 (1983).

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

78:2

differences between the two plans in question were statistically insignificant. So why choose one plan over the other? In the Court's view,
a state must make a good-faith effort to achieve population equality
among districts, and any deviation must be explained andjustified. In
the New Jersey example, the fact that a second plan was available, a
plan with a population disparity closer to zero, required an explanation from the legislative majority in the state. The state did not proffer one, for its real reasons were hardly commendable. And so the
Court struck the plan down.
In contrast, state legislative plans have much greater leeway in
reconciling subsidiary goals with the equality mandate. Here, the
Court has established a de minimis threshold of 10% maximum deviation from equality. 54 Plans under this threshold are presumptively

constitutional. Plans over the threshold are treated as constitutionally
suspicious. This is not to say that they are presumptively unconstitutional, but to say instead that the state must proffer a legitimate state
interest in defense of their redistricting choices. Some of these interests include the maintenance of existing political subdivisions and the
creation of compact, contiguous districts. 55 The pursuit of a politically fair plan, a rather controversial goal, has also been added to this
list.56 To its credit, the Court has shown much needed flexibility in
57
analyzing these plans, as it must.

Taken together, these two approaches encapsulate the spirit of
my argument. To begin, a cursory review of the case law reveals that
58
the Court does not have a theory of politics and representation.
This is precisely as it should be, for the question itself is a difficult and
contested one. The state and local cases reflect this flexibility. The
same may not be said for the congressional cases. The example of
NewJersey after the 1980 census is an extreme one, no doubt. All the
same, it highlights the deficiencies in the Court's approach to redistricting questions. As the Court pursues the equality principle with
thoughtless abandon, it ignores many competing and worthy values.
The argument itself is quite bland and unimpressive. To wit: the
Equal Protection Clause demands equality. Why? Well, because
54 See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977); White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755, 763-64 (1973).
55 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
56 See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973).
57 See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 848 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58 See Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker
v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1417-21 (2002); Daniel H. Lowenstein,
The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics-andBe Thankful for Small Favors, in THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 245 (David K. Ryden ed., 2000).
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equality is demanded by the Equal Protection Clause, for "legislators
represent people, not trees or acres."'59 This is not the Court's most
impressive performance.
Before turning to the next Section, two concluding observations
are warranted. First, the practice of single-member districting sends a
clear signal about our commitment to fragmenting the locus of political representation from the national and state level to the individual
districts. In this way, criticisms of particular districting plans must begin by looking to the individual districts, not the plan as a whole. And
if those within each district are satisfied by the legislative choices
made, what is left of the criticisms? This observation raises a second,
more important point. When analyzing districting plans, the Court is
really inquiring into the decidedly difficult question of "fair representation" raised initially by Reynolds. To be sure, answers to this question
are difficult and contested. This Section does not proffer to have
definitive answers. Rather, it questions the Court's self-assuredness
when providing what are at best debatable answers.
Conclusion: Gerrymandering, Structure and Judicial Review

3.

These arguments in hand, this Section concludes that under present electoral arrangements, courts must play a limited role in political gerrymandering questions. The argument is structural in kind.
We begin with a single-member districting system, which leads to the
creation of two parties. 60 These are the same parties that we place at
the core of the redistricting process. We do not place them ourselves,
of course, yet in assigning this task to state legislatures we essentially
do as much, especially in those states where one party controls the
legislature and the governor's office. Our districting system also produces imperfect district lines, whereby some votes within districts will
necessarily be wasted. The result from this structural design is, and
must be, a politically gerrymandered plan. 6 1 After all, what is a political party to do? In seeking to gain every advantage they can through
redistricting, parties behave as rational actors. It is hard to condemn
them for doing so.
One may respond to this position in two ways. First, this argument demands that parties control the entire process; as such, it will
apply only to a few situations, for it is very seldom that a party may
59

Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.

60 This is known as "Duverger's Law." See MAURICE

DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES:

THEIR ORGANIZATION AND AcTInTv IN THE MODERN STATE
& Pildes, supra note 14, at 675 n.121.

61

See Polsby & Popper, supra note 32.

216-28 (1951); Issacharoff
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achieve this control.6 2 Second, one may criticize the parties for violating other-regarding norms and focusing solely in their interests. This
Article agrees with either of these responses, yet stands by its earlier
conclusion. The first response is quite correct in asserting that these
situations will not arise often. It thus follows that courts will play a
limited role in this area. Note however, that this response does not
speak to the conclusion reached in this Section but its frequency. In
doing so, it reinforces my larger claim.
The second response is also correct. In crafting their partisan
gerrymandered plans, state legislative majorities behave in narrow,
self-interested ways, and in so doing they "offend[ ] the ideal of a public-regarding politics towards which our polity should strive."' !3 And
yet, it is also true that they are behaving rationally. Thus the question:
what else should we ask of them? Under our present configuration, it
seems clear that the result is simply inevitable. This is not to say that
the redistricting process would not benefit from changes in its basic
structure. 6 4 Until it does change, however, the better question looks
to the courts and their posture towards these highly politicized
contests.

65

A common objection to the argument defended in this Section
posits that rationality alone need not lead to a view of judicial deference. As the argument was put to me, the fact that business insiders
wish to make as much money as they possibly can does not mean that
we should not have insider trading laws. Professor Issacharoff makes a
similar move when he analogizes the bipartisan gerrymander to a market division agreement while invoking the authority of the Sherman
Act in order to argue for the illegitimacy of both. 6 6 Both examples
share a common thread: the invocation of statutory law in order to
argue for intervention into market affairs. Such a move is not made in
62 See BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 45, at 9; Schuck, supra note 15, at 1345 n.86.
63 Schuck, supra note 15, at 1330.
64 For example, Sam Issacharoff calls for the establishment of redistricting commissions. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 14, at 699; see also Garrow, supra note 14
("[C]ontrol over redistricting must be taken away from politicians whose goal is to
minimize competitive democratic elections and maximize the number of safe seats for

their party."); Pildes, supra note 43, at 139 ("Thus, however unintended, perhaps the
long-term effect of the Supreme Court's redistricting doctrines will ultimately be to
drive the redistricting process out of the hands of current officeholders-no small
contribution to the ideal and practice of democratic politics.").
65 See Richard L. Hasen, A "Tincture ofJustice":JudgePosner'sFailed Rehabilitationof
Bush v. Gore, 80 TEx. L. REV. 137, 154 (2001) (book review) ("If the Supreme Court
will intervene periodically in the political process, it behooves us to continue the debate over when it is appropriate for courts to intervene in the political process.").
66 See Issacharoff, supra note 11 (manuscript at 6-7, on file with author).
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the redistricting context, for good reason; statutory law in this area is
scant at best. These examples are quite helpful all the same, for they
highlight the position taken by this Article. In a nutshell, and to repeat a point made earlier, were Congress or a state legislature to outlaw bipartisan gerrymanders, however defined, the analogies would
follow quite nicely. This Article would not take issue with such
changes in the law. Without passage of such a law, however, the analogies lose their force. In essence, the critics wish for the Court to intervene into contested matters under the aegis of the equality principle
and very little else. Such a state of affairs is reminiscent of Bush v.
Gore.67 This Article takes the position that, absent explicit statutory
guidance-as found in the antitrust and insider trading context-the
Court must not play an active role.
To conclude, this Section contends that the federal courts should
view the redistricting process from afar. Our structural commitments
lead me to this view. From our commitment to a districting system
arise two competing and fairly stable parties, which we then place in
charge of the redistricting process. The parties then behave rationally
and redistrict to their advantage. Asking the Court to step in at this
point would be to ask it to rearrange political decisions and their expected repercussions irrespective of constitutional commitments.
When putting the point this way, the example of Election 2000 comes
immediately to mind. To ask our courts to step in and influence political controversies of the highest order under their idiosyncratic impressions of fairness should bother many. It is precisely for this reason
that this Article calls for a lessened judicial role.
This position might give some readers reason for pause; after all,
is not redistricting the leading medium through which citizens can
express their political preferences? And further, can anyone truly
committed to the civil rights revolution ask for less from the Court,
not more? Implicit in these questions is whether courts have anything
valuable to offer once they decide to examine redistricting plans. Or,
put differently, how well do redistricters carry out their duties in terms
of political representation? The next Section analyzes this question.
B.

The Real Question: Of Interests and Constituents

Implicit in questions over the concept of representation is a particular background assumption about the nature of our democratic
experiment. Namely, questions of democratic theory are both complex and often intractable. Redistricting cases are really cases about
67

531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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answers to these difficult theoretical questions. 68 This formulation
leads to the question at the heart of this Article. Put simply, what role
do federal courts have to play in redistricting matters, even under the
worst-case scenarios, when state legislatures act in clear political fashion to further their political interests while minimizing the oppositions? To restate the crux of my argument, the federal courts should
play a small role in this area. Questions of representation are not
amenable to easy resolutions and, absent exigent circumstances, it is
best to honor our redistricting pre-commitments, which place the
states at the helm.
In order to see this point more clearly, this Section focuses on the
concept of "fair representation." To the critics, gerrymandered districts offend precisely this concept. In order for the criticisms to have
their intended effect, however, it is not enough to say that gerrymandered districts are constitutionally noxious simply because representatives are choosing their constituents, not the other way around.
After all, the key question is that of representation; so long as this precondition is not violated, complaints should be few. It must be the
case, to put this point differently, that a gerrymandered district fails to
represent those within it, fails to "achiev[e] ...fair and effective rep-

resentation for all citizens. ' 69 The real task lies in translating this formulation into a working definition, a definition with which
redistricters and lower courts can carry out their respective duties.
This is no easy task, which accounts in great measure for the Court's
struggle with this question. To begin, we may take the view, as the
Court did in Reynolds, that the Equal Protection Clause demands a
strict population norm. 7°1 The Baker revolution 7' put this question to
73
rest. 72 In the real world, however, such a norm means very little.

This Section examines two promising understandings of the term.
68 See Bruce E. Cain, Election Law as a Field: A PoliticalScientist's Perspective,32 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1999) (contending that, "even though democratic theory has

not played a major role in [the voting/representation cases], the implicit democratic
theory questions are actually quite important"); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 7, at
1174 (contending that the voting rights arena "tak[es] democracy itself out of the
background and plac[es] it squarely at the center of our inquiries"); Mark Rush, The

Law of Democracy, 5 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 239 (1998) ("[T]he controversies that
inhere in electoral process case law really have everything to do with the conflicting
strains of democratic theory and, in reality, little to do with the inconsistencies of
jurisprudence.").
69 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).

70
71
72

Id. at 568.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
This is not to say, to be clear, that I agree with it. See Cain, supra note 68, at

1110. See generally MORTON

J.
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This Section concludes, as before, that the concept of "fair representation" fares much better than generally allowed.
1. Representation in Congress: Interests
The first version is the well-known concept of interest representation. This version is found at the center of the modern debate over
the nature and scope of the Voting Rights Act, and particularly the
debate after the 1990 census over the creation of majority-minority
districts. This version of representation relegates constitutional concerns to the background. Three reasons lead me to this view.
First, the question of representation is quite difficult, perhaps intractable. The debate over majority-minority districts offers an easy
example. Should a state attempt to maximize majority-minority districts, or should it create instead influence districts? 74 The debate
over this question is quite fierce, devoid of clear and unambiguous
answers. Some researchers, for example, contend that increases in descriptive representation have come at the expense of substantive representation. 75 Others respond that people of color benefit in terms of
political representation when given the chance to elect representatives of color. 76 In this vein, recent studies have concluded that the
election of blacks to Congress affects white political involvement nega77
tively, yet only rarely does it increase black political engagement.
Others dispute this characterization, contending instead that blacks
74-111 (1998) (arguing that the Warren Court was chiefly concerned with democracy writ large and its place in American constitutional law).
73 See Levinson, supra note 49, at 1274; Nathaniel Persily et al., The Complicated
Impact of One Person, One Vote on PoliticalCompetition and Representation, 80 N.C. L. REV.
1299, 1311-12 (2002).
74 I have in mind the modern debate surrounding the enforcement of amended
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTACompare FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWERTION (1997).
MENT IN MISSISSIPPi AFTER 1965 (1990), with CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK
INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS (1993); compare
also Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997), with Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146
(1993).
75 See David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Majority-Minority Districts and the New
TICE

Politics of Congressional Elections, in

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

IN HOUSE ELECTIONS,

supra note 42, at 87.
76 See CANON, supra note 38, at 55-59.
77 See Claudine Gay, The Effect of Black CongressionalRepresentation on PoliticalParticipation, 95 Am. POL. ScI. REV. 589, 589 (2001); see also David A. Bositis, The Future of

Majority-Minority Districts and Black and Hispanic Legislative Representation, in REDISTRICTING AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION:

LEARNING FROM THE PAST, PREPARING FOR THE

Fu-

9 (David A. Bositis ed., 1998) (finding that registered white Democrats may
choose not to participate when the choice is between a white Republican candidate
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mobilize in districts represented by African-Americans, 78 or, more
generally, that the polity as a whole exacts benefits from the election
79
of black and minority representatives.
This debate raises innumerable questions, two of which prove directly relevant to my general thesis. First, how do we find common
ground in this debate? We may think of this question as epistemological in kind. In other words, what are the right answers or, at the very
least, what are the better answers? It should be clear that common
ground has been hard to reach, and will continue to be. This formulation leads to the second question: who should ultimately decide
these questions? Those who look to the U.S. Constitution for answers
are implicitly wishing for the federal courts to resolve these questions.
This move is quite problematic, for not only are the issues raised here
difficult policy questions, but it is also true that the Constitution says
precious little about them.8 0 Without more, these are precisely the
kind of issues better suited for the political process to resolve.
More importantly, this is a debate for which Congress has already
offered its preferred answer, with the Voting Rights Act as amended in
1982. One could disagree with the goals of this seminal statute, enforcement by DOJ, or its interpretation by the Supreme Court; in fact,
many reasonable people do. This is only to say that questions in this
and a black Democratic candidate). Professor Gay's words of caution are worth
considering:
[t]he political significance of black congressional representation cannot be
reduced strictly to measures of policy activism or constituency service, and it
cannot be understood by singular attention to its consequences for black
Americans. To a great extent, the behavior of white constituents truly distinguishes the political dynamics of black-represented districts. The findings of
this study should alert us to the significant role that minority representation

has played in compromising the appeal of politics for many white Americans, while fostering a more dynamic political life for only some African
Americans.
Gay, supra, at 600.
78 See D. Stephen Voss & David Lublin, Black Incumbents, White Districts: An Appraisal of the 1996 CongressionalElections, 29 Am. POL. RES. 141, 150 (2001).
79 See Zoltan L. Hajnal, White Residents, Black Incumbents, and a Declining Racial
Divide, 95 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 603 (2001) (arguing that white Republicans appear immune to effects of black incumbency; however, for Democrats and Independents, a
black mayor decreases racial tension and increases racial sympathy and support for
black leadership).
80 Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DuKE L.J. 187, 192 (1997) ("There
is... nothing in the Constitution that is capable of resolving this social policy dispute
without simply elevating one policy preference above the other for reasons of subjective normative appeal. The meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is simply indeterminate with respect to the constitutionality of [race conscious policymaking].").
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area are quite contested. For this reason, this is a question better left
to the political process. Not surprisingly, a constitutional fight looms
in the near future over the Voting Rights Act. This is unfortunate on
many fronts. I would much rather see a political fight.
Second, once we speak in terms of interests, the locus of representation shifts away from the individual districts and to the general
population. This proposition is well understood. The congressional
career of Luis Gutierrez, Representative from Illinois's 4th Congressional District, offers a pertinent example. To be sure, Representative
Gutierrez represents the people from his district, and apparently does
so quite well.81 It is also true, however, that he pays attention to issues
concerning Puerto Rico, such as the involvement of the U.S. Navy in
Vieques, the status of the island under U.S. rule, and the like.8 2 The
relationship between Rep. Gutierrez and Puerto Rico is such that the
island's governor, Sila Calderon, flew to Chicago to personally campaign for him. 3 Her stated reasons for campaigning in Chicago were
to support candidates who would support the interests of the island.
To be clear, this dynamic is not candidate-specific; similar arguments
may be made for members of the Congressional Black Caucus, women
members of Congress, or any other group salient enough to warrant
representation.8 4 In this context, the notion of gerrymandered dis85
tricts loses much salience. In fact, it becomes largely irrelevant.
Third, it is at best questionable whether the maximization of political influence at a pre-determined point in a ten-year cycle provides
enough evidence to support a claim of "unfair representation." I say
more about this particular point below. For now, it suffices to say that
it is doubtful whether analysts are sophisticated enough to be able to
measure what exactly "unfair representation" looks like.
81
82
2002,

Editorial, Congress, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, at 24.
Democratic Primary Fight in Chicago March 19, PUERTO RICO
available at

HERALD,

Mar. 15,

http://www.puertorico-herald.org/issues/2002/vol6nl 1/Chi-

cagoElection-en.shtml (last visited Dec. 2, 2002).
83 Id.
84 The career of then-Senator Spencer Abraham comes to mind. As an ArabAmerican, it may be said that he represented the interests of Arab-Americans while a
member of Congress. SeeJames Zogby, Abraham and Daniels: Two Arab Americans in the
Bush Cabinet, Washington Watch, Jan. 15, 2001, at http://www.aaiusa.org/wwatch/
011501.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2002).
85 This is not to say that this notion of representation takes precedent over constituent representation; for obvious reasons, it cannot. Members who "invite consistently strong opposition and regularly court defeat in representing their vision of the
national interest" are taken care of by the political process. GARY C. JACOBSON, THE
POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

231 (3d ed. 1992).
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Representation in Districts: Constituents

The second version dovetails on the previous discussion of representation within single-member districts. The point as generally made
is that gerrymandered districts are unrepresentative districts, unfair,
undemocratic. Under our present state of affairs, the argument goes,
incumbents have gained such a stranglehold on the process that they
do not afford their constituents the proper degree of political representation. Rather, they are said to represent particularized interests,
in the form of interest groups or political action committees. This
charge has a lot to commend it and resonates widely with the general
public, as the debate over term limits amply demonstrated. However,
the supporting evidence is not particularly favorable. 86
To begin, the evidence supports the view that members of Congress do a creditable job of representing their constituents. 8 7 This po-

sition makes sense, for incumbents must please a majority of their
constituents in order to hold on to their seats. And they do, in two
ways. One way to please constituents is by committing staff members
to the casework generated from the district. It matters little that
much of this casework stems from rules and procedures created by
Congress itself. As far as the constituents are concerned, their representative is solving their problems, and that is all that matters. s8

This

is another way of saying that members of Congress place reelection
atop their list of priorities, and this in turn leads them to structure the
institution in ways that will not hurt their prospects.8 9
86 As this evidence largely focuses on the federal legislature, the discussion will be
largely limited to this branch of government. For a recent study examining both state

and congressional data and reaching similar conclusions as to both, see Stephen Ansolabehere &James M. Snyder, Jr., The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections: An Anal-

ysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942-2000, 1 ELECTION LJ. 315 (2002), showing that
incumbency advantage has grown for state and local offices across both legislative and
electoral offices although marginals have declined only for House elections, and concluding that a needed explanation cannot simply point to incumbency alone.
87 Robert S. Erikson & Gerald C. Wright, Voters, Candidates, and Issues in Congressional Elections, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 91, 112 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I.
Oppenheimer eds., 1993) ("In terms of ideological direction, individual House and
Senate members respond to their constituencies. In turn, ideological direction matters when constituencies decide which candidates they will elect and which they will
not.").
88 See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 54-55 (1974);
Morris P. Fiorina, The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It, 71 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 177, 179-81 (1977).
89 See John R. Alford & David W. Brady, Personal and PartisanAdvantage in U.S.
Congressional Elections, 1846-1990, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 87, at 141.
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A second way by which to please constituents is through policy
congruence. At first glance, it should be obvious that perfect congruence between a representative and her constituency is factually impossible; 90 congruence is thus a question of degree. It is also true that
researchers have had a difficult time measuring constituency opinion,
assuming that such a thing exists on any given issue. Left to their
ingenuity, researchers have cautiously concluded that a link indeed
exists between constituency opinion and roll-call voting, although the
connection varies across issue contexts and is not terribly strong. 91
The notion of policy congruence leads to a much more important issue: whether elections allow voters to control their congressional representatives. In light of the negative connotations attached
to the institution of Congress with its ranks full of incumbents and
career politicians, the expected answer to this question is negative.
Some research supports this conclusion,9 2 yet not all. Others question
this conclusion, and argue instead that electors in fact control their
representatives through the ballot box, if indirectly. According to this
competing view, representatives anticipate the preferences of unattentive citizens while accounting for the preferences they do know, those
from attentive publics. 93 In this way, they estimate the potential preferences of their constituents, in order to avoid future electoral
trouble.
A final point merits attention. Throughout this Section, the specter of careerism has loomed large. This is the central argument offered against gerrymandering: that incumbents are able to manipulate
district lines for self-serving ends, benefiting themselves at the expense of the public at large. One may respond to this position a number of ways. First, it is useful to look at the causes behind the high
retention of incumbents in Congress. Among these, one finds the
90 See ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 27-34 (1970).
91 See, e.g., Gillian Dean et al., Constituency Preference and Potential Economic Gain:
Cues for Senate Voting on the Family Assistance Plan, 9 Am. POL. Q. 341, 351-52 (1981);
Walter J. Stone, Measuring Constituency-RepresentativeLinkages: Problems and Prospects, 4
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 623, 627-30 (1979). For the conclusion that roll-call voting plays an
important role in terms of electoral accountability, see Brandice Canes-Wrone et al.,
Out of Step, Out of Office: ElectoralAccountability and House Members' Voting, 96 Am. POL.
ScL. REV. 127, 127, 132-38 (2002).
92

See, e.g.,

ROBERT
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BERNSTEIN,
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REPRESENTATION,

AND

CONGRES.

SIONAL VOTING BEHAVIOR: THE MYTH OF CONSTITUENCY CONTROL

98 (1989) (concluding that elections "do not serve as a 'mechanism through which citizens control their
government'

(quoting

ROBERT WEISSBERG, PUBLIC OPINION AND

POPULAR

170 (1976))).
93 See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS 32-35 (3d ed. 1989).
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franking privilege, generous travel allowances, staff devoted solely to
constituency work, and "greater access to publicity and campaign
cash." 94 These various perks allow the incumbent to create a positive
image for herself in her district, an advantage that prospective opponents must fight very hard to overcome. Other factors include redistricting, weaker challengers, and weakened party identification. 95 Yet
another view of congressional elections and the high rate of incumbency reelection brands members of Congress as "strategic actors who
created their own campaign organizations, knew their districts, took
positions, advertised, and claimed credit." 96 These incumbents ultimately win elections "not because they were 'safe' by some outside
standard; rather, they were safe because they understood their district[s], tailored their campaigns to the[ir] district, performed nonpartisan constituency services, and rather than lose, they strategically
retired when losing seemed like a likely prospect. '9 7 Curiously, from
all the factors offered to explain the high rate of incumbent success,
John Alford and David Brady conclude that "only redistricting seems
to be clearly incorrect."9 8 They reach this conclusion due to the fact
that the Senate shows a similar pattern of incumbency advantage post1960, yet the institution does not undergo redistricting changes. 9 9

94
95
96

Erikson & Wright, supra note 87, at 99.
See Alford & Brady, supra note 89, at 151.
David W. Brady et al., An Introduction to Continuity and Change in House Elections,

in CONTINUI[V AND CHANGE IN HOUSE ELECTIONS, supra note 42, at 4.
97 Id.; see GARY W. Cox & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY'S SALAMANDER:

THE

7-8 (2002) (contending that incumbents "retire when scared off, and this propensity inflates standard
estimates of the incumbency advantage. Indeed, by our estimates, the incumbency
advantage enjoyed by Democratic incumbents was never-even after 1966-statistically discernible from zero"); Gary C. Jacobson, Reversal of Fortune: The Transformation
of U.S. House Elections in the 1990s, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN HOUSE ELECTIONS,
supra note 42, at 10-11 (documenting the decline in incumbency advantage in the
last 40 years).
98 Alford & Brady, supra note 89, at 151.
99 See also Kenneth Collier & Michael Munger, A Comparison of Incumbent Security
in the House and Senate, 78 PUB. CHOICE 145, 145-46 (1994) (challenging the "conventional wisdom[,] and assert[ing] that the advantage enjoyed by members of the
House compared to those of the Senate has been exaggerated and that Senators are
just as secure in office, if not more so"); Amihai Glazer & Bernard Grofman, Two Plus
Two Equals Six: Tenure in Office of Senators and Representatives 1953-1983, 12 LEG. STUD.
Q. 555 (1987) (developing a mathematical model and demonstrating that, in terms of
expected years of service, members of both House and Senate may be equally secure).
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION
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Second, one may conclude, if cautiously, that longer terms in
Congress do not result in reduced attention to constituents.1 00 In
fact, level of voter satisfaction with their particular incumbents is quite
high.' 0 1 The reasons for this support are not surprising. For one, the
style of each representative as she goes back to her district varies yet,
by and large, representatives seek to inspire trust in their constituents
while emphasizing accessibility.' 0 2 This strategy leads to a level of
comfort that might help excuse "bad" votes and ultimately poses the
representative as "one of us." If and when this happens, electoral support is likely forthcoming. Another reason is structural. As Gary
Jacobson explains, "[t]he system allows members to take the 'right'
positions, make pleasing statement, and bring home the bacon while
avoiding responsibility for the collective performance of Congress."'1 3
This argument leads to Fenno's paradox: the public hates Congress
while it simultaneously loves its own representative. 10 4 This sentiment
has been modified recently: "it seems that voters hate incumbency but
at least tolerate their incumbent."' 0 5 And toleration is a good thing in
electoral terms, as far as the incumbent is concerned.
Before turning to the next Part, which discusses the fate of the
gerrymander in court, a caveat is warranted. In presenting this social
science evidence, I must underscore the fact that this Section does not
profess to settle these longstanding and contentious debates. A cursory glance at the arguments presented here should make that clear.
Rather, my point is far more limited. Those who assail gerrymandering practices and call for increased judicial intervention fall back all
too often on stereotypes and accepted understandings; rarely do they
point to this or any other evidence. As argued earlier, the gerrymanclering debate is really a debate over the question of "fair representation." This is a debate worth having. This Part takes that view
seriously and concludes that the concept of representation does not
fare as poorly as the critics assert. On the contrary, it fares remarkably
well.
This view in tow, the next question concerns how the gerrymandering question has fared in court. Such is the task of the next Part.
100 John R. Hibbing, Careerism in Congress: For Better or For Worse?, in
CONSIDERED, supra note

CONGRESS RE-

87, at 67.

101 SeeJACOBSON, supra note 85, at 136-41.
102 RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE
(1978).
103 JACOBSON, supra note 85, at 38.
104 See FENNO, supra note 102, at 164-68.
105 Alford & Brady, supra note 89, at 155.
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THE GERRYMANDER IN COURT: EXAMINING THE CLASSIC
POLITICAL QUESTION

A.

Doctrine: The Road from Reynolds to Bandemer Through the New
Jersey Turnpike

The question of manageable standards in redistricting is an important one, deserving of careful consideration. Yet, as the late Professor Dixon wrote shortly after the Court's initial tightening of its
equipopulation rule, "Wielding one man, one vote, like a meat-ax, the
Court has not been content only to lop off extreme population malapportionment. It has come close to subordinating all aspects of political representation to one overriding element-absolute equality of
population in all legislative districts." 10 6 The Court has not guarded
this area flexibly, as it must, but has micro-managed. Instead of judicial guardianship, we have had a judicial straightjacket. Instead of a
judicial branch, we have gotten an institution that resembles its legisla10 7
tive counterparts much too closely.
106

Dixon, supra note 3, at 7, 11; see Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 774 (1983)

(White,J., dissenting) ("The only way a legislature or bipartisan commission can hope
to avoid litigation will be to dismiss all other legitimate concerns and opt automatically for the districting plan with the smallest deviation. Yet no one can seriously
contend that such an inflexible insistence upon mathematical exactness will serve to
promote 'fair and effective representation' .....

Such sterile and mechanistic applica-

tion only brings the principle of one man, one vote into disrepute."); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 510 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (complaining that
apportionment "is far too subtle and complicated a business to be resolved as a matter
of constitutional law in terms of sixth-grade arithmetic").
107 In a recent essay, Rick Pildes has analogized this area of the law to the infamous Lochner era. See Pildes, supra note 43, at 127-28; see also WARD E.Y. ELLIOTT,
THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY (1974) (offering theories to explain the rise of
voting reforms in the past and present, and discussing the effect that Supreme Court
involvement in the reform process has had on American democracy); PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 92 (1970) (arguing that

the Court has come to emulate legislative institutions, and wrongly so, because the
Court has a responsibility to discrete minorities, whereas legislatures respond to majorities, individuals, and interest groups); Ward Elliott, Prometheus, Proteus, Pandora,
and Procrustes Unbound: The Political Consequences of Reapportionment, 37 U. CHI. L. REv.
474, 492 (1970) (arguing that reapportionment has had only a trivial influence on
politics, and claiming it has not revitalized representational government but instead

has exhibited a court "imposing their own distorted and incomplete versions of representative government upon the states"); Philip B. Kurland, Equal in Origin and Equal
in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143

(1964) (describing the proactive nature of the Warren Supreme Court and suggesting
that there is no threat of opposition to such judicial power from the other branches).
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The Court's very own evolution from its early Baker v. Cart 08 days
to the end of the Burger Court's tenure supports this position. Soon
after the judicial gate swung open in Baker, the Court adopted an individual rights model of the franchise and the right to vote. Under this
view, each and every person must be afforded the right to cast an
equally weighed ballot. Each person, to use the Court's own language, must have one undiluted vote. 109 This view, taken to its ex10
treme, brought us Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,I
Wells v. Rockefeller,11 1 and, in
a five-four decision, Karcher v. Daggett,1 12 instances where minuscule
degrees of vote dilution, some statistically insignificant, were declared
unconstitutional in the presence of alternative plans with lower ratios.
The Burger Court, however, soon moved away from this voting rights
model and towards a group-centered model of politics and political
participation.1 13 Fittingly, the last major case of the Burger Court's
tenure, Davis v. Bandemer l I 4 encapsulates a sensible approach to voting rights cases.
This Part tells the story of the gerrymander in court over the
course of three Sections. The first Section looks to the Court's early
incursion into the reapportionment field, in Baker v. Car.'1 5 It argues
that this action was both necessary and appropriately respectful of the
complexities inherent in this area. This position is also consistent
with the Court's holding in Reynolds v. Sims, when the Court extended
the equipopulation principle to state legislative plans.1 16 The second
Section moves ahead a generation, to the Court's holding in Karcherv.
Daggett.117 Karcher is important not for what it says as much as for what
it refuses to see. As a result, Karcher displays the Court's clear misgivings with the gerrymandering problem as well as its inability to examine it appropriately. Finally, the third Section discusses the Court's
answer to the hated gerrymander, in Davis v. Bandemer. 18 This Section sides with the Court and concludes that its approach is a sensible
one, respectful of legislative authority while mindful of the pitfalls and
partisan possibilities inherent to the redistricting craft.
108 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
109
110

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
394 U.S. 526 (1969).
111 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
112 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
113 See NANCY MAVEETY, REPRESENTATION RIGHTS AND
(1991).
114 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
115 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
116 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 536-37 (1964).
117 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 725.
118 Davis, 478 U.S. at 109.
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1. Baker's Promise and Reynolds's Deliverance
Looking back to the Court's initial entry into the famed political
thicket, the source of the Court's displeasure was quite clear. In examining the redistricting plan in Tennessee, it was difficult, perhaps
impossible, to proffer a legitimate state interest in defense of the
state's action. Plain and simple, the legislature had refused to enact a
reapportionment plan since 1901, and in so doing the lines by 1960
had very little relation to the population figures of the existing districts. Also, the facts raised a very convincing case for the proposition
that city dwellers, who composed a clear majority within the state in
terms of population, had no way, short of revolution, for changing the
status quo. This was a classic lockout scenario, for those in power
were entrenched and refused to give up that power voluntarily. For
this reason, it is widely held that the Court's intervention was
necessary. 19
The problem with the Court's opinion in Baker is often found not
in what the Court did, but what it did not do. To most observers, the
Court gave precious guidance to the lower courts deciding redistricting cases post-Baker. I do not share this sentiment; 120 I do agree, however, that the Court left many things unsaid. For example, it is clear
that while the Court did not adhere to a strict population requirement, population played a key role in its decision, as it must. This is
true for both the majority opinion and the various concurrences, all
of which pointed to the existing population disparities as proof of the
irrationality of the plan. It is also true that the Court could have said a
great deal more on the issue of standards. What counts as a legitimate
state interest, for example? Further, if rationality lies at the core of
the equal protection standard applicable in redistricting cases, how far
from population equality may a state deviate without coming into conflict with constitutional proscriptions?
The Court turned to these and similar questions two terms later,
in Reynolds v. Sims.1 21 In Reynolds, the Court confronted a scenario
similar to the one in Baker: the State of Alabama had refused to
redraw its district lines for quite some time, and as such the population numbers within each existing district bore very little semblance of
rationality. On these facts, the Court purported to provide a standard
119

See Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Some Reflections on Baker v. Carr, 15 VAND. L.
829, 836 (1962); Anthony Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the FederalCourts, 71
HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1086 (1957).
120 See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 2, at 1357-59.
121 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 533.
REV.
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proper to the constitutional inquiry first developed under Baker. It
did so in the following way:
representative government is in essence self-government through
the medium of elected representatives of the people, and each and
every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies. Most
citizens can achieve this participation only as qualified voters
through the election of legislators to represent them. Full and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires,
therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the
election of members of his state legislature. Modern and viable
state government needs, and the Constitution demands, no less. 122
This argument places population equality at the center of the debate over standards for redistricting. The Court made this proposition much clearer a few pages below, when it wrote that "[p] opulation
is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration and the controlling criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment
23
controversies." 1
This point is now well established in the literature and requires
very little explanation. A much more interesting point, and one that
may be gleaned from the Court's own opinion in Reynolds, argues that
Baker and Reynolds share similar doctrinal traits and approaches.
Under Baker, states were required to use population as a starting
point. A majority of lower courts with redistricting cases in their dockets so understood Baker soon after it was decided. The more important aspect of the Court's initial approach looked to deviations from
the population standard. That is, states could deviate from population equality, yet egregious population disparities required a justification. At this point in the inquiry, states must proffer a legitimate
reason for the their particular plans.
The Court's opinion in Reynolds may be understood similarly. In
general, the Court held that "as a basic constitutional standard, the
Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a
bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. ''"24
This is now standard fare in redistricting circles. Yet, the
Court told us a lot more than this. 125 In the next sentence, for example, we are told that "an individual's right to vote for state legislators is
unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantialfashion
122
123
124

Id. at 565.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 568.

125

See Schotland, supra note 25, at 1505-06.
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diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of
the State. ' 126 Also, the Alabama plan is unconstitutional because its
deviation from population equality is "too egregious" to afford a con12 7
clusion that it "was apportioned sufficiently on a population basis."
In this vein, the Court made clear that "mathematical nicety is not a
constitutional requisite," yet legislatures must be apportioned "suffi128
ciently on a population basis."
What, then, is the real standard under Reynolds? It is not "mathematical exactness or precision," the Court made clear.129 Rather, "the
Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an honest and
good faith effort to construct districts ... as nearly of equal population as is practicable."' 130 The choice of words reveals a great deal
about the doctrinal posturing established by the Court's opinion. The
redistricting effort to craft districts of equal population must be "honest" and of "good faith."' 13 1 Equality must only be achieved "as is practicable."' 13 2 This is not the language of rigid rules and ready-made
answers; this is language that establishes a flexible constitutional
norm, a language of institutional flexibility both for courts and legislatures. At all times, however, the goal remains "affording adequate rep133
resentation to all parts of the State."
As part of this constitutional inquiry, the language employed by
the Court left much for the states to carry out their redistricting duties
as necessary. Some states may wish to "maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions, insofar as possible"; 3 4 others may wish to
create "compact districts of contiguous territory."1 5 Also, what may
be permissible in one state may not be so in another, depending on
the particular circumstances at play. 13 6 In sum, "[slo long as the divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate
considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy,"'137 deviations from population equality are permissible. On this
test, a state's justifications will prove to be key, for deviations are acceptable so long as they are properly justified. This is not to say that
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568 (emphasis added).
Id. at 569.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 577.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 578 (emphasis added).

134
135
136
137

Id.
Id.
Id. at 579.
Id.
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the Court gave redistricters free rein, for it did not. In fact, it foreclosed some avenues that might be perfectly rational, such as geographical considerations. 138 It is to say instead that the Court did not
intend to apply the equipopulation principle as a straightjacket. It is
to say that Reynolds is much closer to Baker than often presumed.
A final point merits consideration. While pursuing this doctrinal
course, the Court was cognizant of larger questions of political representation. In explaining that a state may choose to follow preexisting
political subdivisions, the Court wrote that "[i] ndiscriminate districting ...

may be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerry-

mandering."' 13 9 Put this way, it appears as if the Court did not wish to
condone the practice, much less encourage it. And yet, it is clear
from the opinion that it did not wish to address the gerrymandering
question head on. Through the years, this question has been quite
elusive, and properly so.
2.

Avoiding the Inevitable: Karcher v. Daggett

The Court had many opportunities to address the gerrymandering question post-Reynolds, yet declined to do So.140 The New Jersey
redistricting plan post-1980 census provided the Court with yet another opportunity to address this concededly difficult question. A majority of the Court declined the invitation yet managed to invalidate
the enacted plan on a questionable reading of the relevant constitutional standard. This was a classic "backdoor" invalidation of a gerry142
mander. 4 1 The case was Karcher v. Daggett.
In Karcher, the Court confronted a clear partisan gerrymander in
the redistricting plan for New Jersey's congressional delegation. The
Democratic Party controlled the process in its entirety and was thus
able to craft any districting plan of their liking, which it undoubtedly

138 See id. at 580. The Court also rejected the federal analogy or the balancing of
urban and rural interests. See id. at 571-76. Additionally, the Court downplayed the
existence of legislative inaction, see Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 691 (1964), or the
availability of state remedies, such as initiatives or referenda. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 733 (1964). In so doing, it went farther than Baker
professed to go.
139 Reynolds, 377 U.S at 578-79.
140 See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Taylor v. McKeithen, 407
U.S. 191 (1972); Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 112-13 n.5 (1971).
141 DixoN, supra note 33, at 493-96.
142 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
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did.'143 As such, the question in Karcherwas not whether a gerrymander had taken place; rather, the real question looked to the Court and
its doctrinal analysis of the gerrymander. Perhaps surprisingly, the
Court chose to duck this important question once again.
The case came down to the minutiae of statistics, census data and
population inequality. According to the new census figures, New
Jersey was entitled to fourteen congressional seats, with each seat at an
average population of 526,059.144 The legislature agreed on a plan
with average districts that differed from the ideal figure by 0.1384%,
or 726 people. 45 Furthermore, the difference between the largest
district and the smallest district was 0.6984% of the average district,
approximately 3674 people. 46 Of note, a competing plan offered to
the legislature by Dr. Ernest Reock, political science professor at
Rutgers University and Director of the Bureau of Government Re47
search, had a maximum difference of 0.4514%, or 2375 people.'
The Court began its analysis by recalling its high standard of review for congressional districts. In essence, this is a standard where
equal really means equal and de minimis deviations from equality are
non-existent. For the Court, the first question in litigation of this kind
is whether any existing population variances could have been reduced
or even eliminated with a better effort from the legislature. Those
who challenge the redistricting plan carry the burden of proof here;
they must show lack of a good faith effort on the part of the legislature. Failure to overcome this burden ends the inquiry. If this burden is met, the second question then asks the State to proffer
evidence to show that the existing variances are necessary to achieve a
148
legitimate goal.

In framing the inquiry this way, the Court set aside the gerrymandering question for another day. All the same, it held against the New
Jersey gerrymander. To begin, the Court explained that no de
minimis standards exist in congressional districting; after all, if a 0.7%
deviation should be considered de minimis, how would the Court evaluate a 0.8% deviation, or 0.9%, or 1.0%?

14 9

Thus framed, the ques-

tion was really about the justifications proffered by the State in
143 See id. at 788-89 ("In this case, one cannot rationally believe that the New
Jersey Legislature considered factors other than the most partisan political goals and
population equality.").
144 Id. at 727-28.
145 Id. at 728.
146 Id.
147 [d. at 728-29.
148 See id. at 730-31.
149 See id. at 732.
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choosing the plan that it chose. The State did not proffer very much,
and as such their chosen plan failed constitutional scrutiny.
The Court's decision in Karcher does not provide very much evidence on the crucial question of judicial standards for gerrymandering cases. The evidence it does provide points to the general level of
discomfort by various members of the Court on the gerrymandering
question. This is one of two lessons that may be gleaned from the
Karcher opinion. More specifically, it is clear that this opinion is but a
backdoor approach to invalidating what is clearly a gerrymandered
districting plan. A more formal, unambiguous approach must loom
on the horizon. The second lesson picks up on a comment made earlier about the Court's approach in this area. Put simply, it is clear that
the Court does not have a theory of democratic politics.15o It is also
clear, as seen quite starkly in Karcher, that the equipopulation standard does not begin to fill the necessary void. As such, it could be said
at the time of Karcher that momentum was gaining for the Court to
face the doctrinal merits of the gerrymandering question. On this
particular point, the Court did not disappoint.
3.

Back to Baker: Davis v. Bandemer

Three years later, the Court finally confronted the hated gerrymander. The setting this time was the Indiana redistricting process;
the case was Davis v. Bandemer.15 1 In Bandemer, the plaintiffs brought a
challenge to the state reapportionment plan, alleging that the enacted
plan had been drafted in order to disadvantage the Democratic Party
and its delegates. According to their claim, "each political group in a
State should have the same chance to elect representatives of its
choice as any other political group.' 52 Put differently, the claim here
is that "Democratic voters over the State as a whole, not Democratic
voters in particular districts, have been subjected to unconstitutional
discrimination."'1 53 Put this way, the question of political representation arises quite forcefully. Unsurprisingly, the Court's answer to this
decidedly complex question left a lot to be desired.
Declaring this claim ajusticiable one, a Court plurality held that
the plaintiffs must "prove both intentional discrimination against an
identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that
group" 15 4 in order to prove their claim. The intentionality inquiry
150
151
152
153
154

See Lowenstein, supra note 58 passim.
478 U.S. 109 (1986).
Id. at 124.
Id. at 127.
Id.
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poses modest requirements; after all, "[a]s long as redistricting is
done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove that the
likely political consequences of the reapportionment were intended." 155 The effects prong has proven to be far more cryptic. In
the Court's words,
[U]nconstitutional discrimination occurs when the electoral system
is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter or a
group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole....
[T]he question is whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process ....

In this context, such a finding of unconstitutionality must

be supported by evidence of continued frustrationof the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair
15 6
chance to influence the political process.
Under this exigent test, political gerrymanders are unconstitutional in their most egregious forms. It is not enough for the plaintiffs
to claim that they lost a political battle or a series of elections. According to the Court, the plaintiffs must show a political process breakdown where the system could no longer, by any sensible account, be
called democratic. 157 Bandemer thus signals a judicial propensity to
safeguard the democratic process gingerly. As long as the process
functions properly, the Court will remain uninvolved; only when the
process malfunctions, to the point of collapse, will the Court intervene
and afford litigants a remedy, in the name of democratic principles.
Seen this way, one may analogize the Court's position in Bandemer
to a market scenario, in the sense that benefits to consumers are best
155
156

Id. at 129.
Id. at 132-33 (emphasis added). The Court stated that
an equal protection violation may be found only where the electoral system
substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence
the political process effectively. In this context, such a finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by evidence of continued frustration of the
will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a
fair chance to influence the political process.
Id. at 133.
157 This is another way of saying that Bandemer is rightly concerned about process
failure. See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
PoliticalFairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1663 (1993) ("The Supreme Court's adoption
of the partisan gerrymandering cause of action in Bandemer turns on a belief that
gerrymandering is indeed a significant problem which can rise to the level of an tinconstitutional distortion of the political process."); cf Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the
Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 254 ("Only when
the state process fails completely ought federal courts step in and do the reapportionment themselves.").
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reflected in healthy, robust competition in a free market. 158 Once a
firm achieves its goals too well and monopolizes its given field, however, federal law is immediately implicated. Similarly, Bandemer calls
for judicial intervention only when redistricters do their jobs too well.
Due to the difficulties inherent in the redistricting task, this will not
happen often. To some, this is Bandemers undoing; 159 to my mind,
therein lies its virtue.
Curiously, the scholarly commentary on Bandemer is predominantly critical of the Court's position. In general, critics complain not
that Bandemeris an unwelcome intrusion into political matters, 160 but,
puzzlingly, that Bandemer does not extend the Court's doctrinal venture far enough. As one critic put this point, "it is a necessary accompaniment to the one person, one vote accomplishment to make sure
that election procedures are truly fair." 16 1 Another such critic explained, in my view more sensibly, "the ultimate test of Davis v.
Bandemer will be determined by its ability to provide relief from egregious political gerrymandering without exposing virtually every districting plan to tedious and unnecessary judicial scrutiny."' 162 These
accounts posit the Court as democratic arbiter, as the only institution
with both the will and the wherewithal to police the combustible
arena of political reapportionment.' 6
These criticisms have gained much currency in recent years. This
Section takes direct issue with them. To be clear, it concedes the
prior point, whether the Court could develop useful standards in this
area without subjecting our political institutions to a system of proportional representation. On this point, the critics are both ready and
willing to provide standards,1 64 and this Section does not dispute
158

See Schuck, supra note 15, at 1338-48. See generally Issacharoff & Pildes, supra

note 14, at 646 (arguing that "an appropriately competitive partisan environment"
enables a "well-functioning political process").
159 See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 563 (1998); Ely, supra note 11, at 617.
160 Some critics do make this point. See Schuck, supra note 15, at 1330 (insisting
that "U]udicial regulation of partisan gerrymandering would be a cure worse than the
disease").
161 Backstrom et al., supra note 23, at 165; see Ely, supra note 11, at 621.
162 Grofman, supra note 22, at 29, 57-58.

163

See Samuel Issacharoff, Oversight of Regulated PoliticalMarkets, 24 HARV. J.L. &
97 (2000) ("Unfortunately, the most significant power [not immedi-

PUB. POL'Y 91,

ately accountable to the political process] is possessed by the judiciary.").

164

See, e.g., Backstrom et al., supra note 23, at 160-62 (proposing a standard of

unconstitutional gerrymandering-"whether that number of districts in which the
majority party dominates is other than 50% plus one of all districts"-and developing
its measure); Gordon E. Baker, The "Totality of Circumstances" Approach, in POLITICAL

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

78:2

them. The better question is whether the Court should intervene in
these highly political contests. The answer is not as facile as many
critics periodically posit. As a result, this Section sidesteps the critics'
contention that Bandemer's doctrine is practically non-existent in any
useful sense. It is true that federal courts have only once struck down

note 22, at 203 (enumerating eight indicators that courts may consider when determining when a political gerrymander has
occurred). In the opinion of Michael D. McDonald and Richard L. Engstrom, who
provide yet another measure of political gerrymandering,
A gerrymander exists when (1) the district configurations do not provide, as
nearly as is practicable, a symmetrical pattern of the groups percentages
across districts, or (2) the group percentages are not, as nearly as is practicable, what could be expected to arise from the residential patterns when the
formal districting criteria are applied.
Michael D. McDonald & Richard L. Engstrom, Detecting Gerrymandering, in POLT1ICAL
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 22, at 178, 189; see also Robert N. ClinGERRVMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra

ton, FurtherExplorations in the Political Thicket: The Gerrymanderand the Constitution,59
Iowa L. REV. 1, 40-41 (1973) ("A review should analyze the entire apportionment

scheme to determine whether it operates to systematically dilute a particular interest's
vote, thereby creating a special obstacle to that group's efforts to use the electoral
process to effectuate their policy objectives."); Richard L. Engstrom, The Supreme Court
and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fairand Effective
Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 282 (offering a burden shifting standard,

whereby plaintiffs would only need to make a prima facie case and the burden to
explain and justify the plan would fall to the state).
In this vein, Justice Stevens has similarly argued that
the proper standard is suggested by three characteristics of the gerrymander
condemned in Gomillion: (1) the 28-sided configuration was, in the Court's
word, "uncouth," that is to say, it was manifestly not the product of a routine
or a traditional political decision; (2) it had a significant adverse impact on a
minority group; and (3) it was unsupported by any neutral justification and
thus was either totally irrational or entirely motivated by a desire to curtail
the political strength of the minority.
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 90 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). In Karcher,Justice
Stevens stated,
If a State is unable to respond to a plaintiff's prima facie case by showing
that its plan is supported by adequate neutral criteria, I believe a court could
properly conclude that the challenged scheme is either totally irrational or
entirely motivated by a desire to curtail the political strength of the affected
political group.
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 760-61 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 860 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]f a
highly improbable shape is inexplicable except by reference to an impermissible gerrymandering purpose, in my opinion a challenge to the classification as resting on a
ground wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a valid state objective should be
sustained.").
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a redistricting plan on Bandemer grounds. 1 65 This is a function of the
Court's understanding of democratic politics; by definition the question of "egregious" gerrymanders will necessitate the enduring control
of a state majority by one party.' 66 This is very difficult to do, perhaps
impossible. Seen this way, Bandemer is thus a case for relaxed standards and intervention only for extreme cases, as Grofman's words
intimate1 6 7 and others have accurately forecasted.' 6 On this reading,
I have yet to see a case that calls for judicial intervention. Interest1
ingly, neither has the Court.

69

Before turning to and answering some of the leading objections
to the partisan gerrymandering doctrine, it is worth pausing briefly to
underline the current state of the doctrine. In light of Davis v.
Bandemer,170 it is clear that the Court now has at least a semblance of a
theory of democratic politics. This is the lockout theory, which worries whether groups have been completely shut out of the political
process. The Court's initial entry into the redistricting thicket was influenced in great measure by this problem, as political and geographical minorities in state legislatures simply refused to release their
strangleholds on state power. We saw this problem in Tennessee preBaker and in Alabama pre-Reynolds, among others. In Baker, for example, Justice Clark did not side with the ultimate majority on the ques165 See Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 950-58 (4th Cir. 1992). This case
is important for many reasons, particularly for the way in which it highlights the philosophical differences between defenders of an aggressive posture to judicial review of
politics and the more passive model I defend here. Soon after the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the lower court finding of an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, the
Republican party managed to stage a comeback in the midterm elections, obtaining a
legislative majority in the state House for the first time in this century. See Edward
Walsh, North Carolina Reflects Voting Shift in South: GOP Takeover Nov. 8 Both Wide and
Deep, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1994, at Al. Professor Issacharoff brands this judicial incursion an "embarrassment," Issacharoff, supra note 11 (manuscript at 11-12, on file
with author), and I do not disagree with the label. To his mind, this means that the
case law must provide clearer standards by which to guide lower courts; to my mind,
in contrast, this means that courts must play a very passive role.
166 The critics also raise objections to the bipartisan gerrymander, which they
equate to a political cartel. The earlier point about the concept of representation, see
supra Part I.B., applies with equal force to this argument.
167 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
168 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap: Gerrymanderingand Equal Protection,
in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 22, at 64.
169 Consistent with early warnings of the Court's role in political matters, the
plaintiffs must meet a very high standard. These claims, while justiciable, will not
carry the day under most circumstances. See Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 669-71
(N.D. Cal. 1988) (three-judge court), affd, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989).
170 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
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tion of judicial intervention until he was convinced that the courts
were the only institution capable of dislodging the existing power
glut.17 1 In Reynolds, the district court took a similar view of the facts at
issue, and in so doing sought to "releas[e] the strangle hold on the
legislature sufficiently so as to permit the newly elected body to enact
172
On
a constitutionally valid and permanent reapportionment plan."

my reading of Bandemer, this is exactly the view of democratic politics
pursued by the plurality.' 73 Short of a lockout, the political process
should be left alone.
Further, it is worth keeping in mind two of the central premises
of this Article: that all redistricting is gerrymandering and that redistricting raises difficult and contested political questions of the highest
order. It is also worth remembering Justice Douglas's observation that
174
the gerrymandering question is "the other half of Reynolds v. Sims."
In many important respects, these views are reflected in the argument
to this point. Its conclusion is also mindful of this reality. More specifically, we must treat the redistricting and gerrymandering questions
together, for they are but two sides of the same coin. In doing so, this
Article contends that the proper doctrinal approach is to adopt a de
minimis standard across the board (which will take care of all future
17 5
Karchers) and then apply Bandemer across the board.
B.

Objections: Of Bad Numbers, Bad Process and Safe Seats

The Bandemer standard has proven to have very little teeth, and its
tenets "may be difficult of application."'176 Short of taking the task
away from legislatures, the standard is as it should be, for this approach "recognizes the delicacy of intruding on this most political of
legislative functions."' 177 In response to the likely criticisms of this po171 See Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam: WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 29,
35 (1997).
172 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 543 (1964).
173 See also Cain, supra note 16, at 1601.
174 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 176 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
175 See Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities
Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 108-09.

176 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 142 (1986).
177 Id. at 143. In taking this view, this Part agrees with Peter Schuck and his view
of the political process and limited court intervention. See Schuck, supra note 15, at
1330. Our differences lie mainly in our confidence in the ability of gerrymanderers to
lock up their processes competently. In light of our malapportionments of the past,
this Part does not share his optimism in declaring these questions nonjusticiable. Let
me be clear. If the point is that the Court has no role to play in these matters, as
Justice Frankfurter seemed to advocate in his dissent in Baker, then the old malapportioned plans of the past may become a worry again. Reynolds took care of this worry by
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sition, the next Section addresses four traditional objections to partisan gerrymanders in general.
1. The Conventional Seats/Votes Ratio
The first objection looks to the raw numbers at issue in the Indiana election of 1982. This point, simply, is that a majority of voters
supported one party over its main competitor, and yet this electoral
victory was not reflected in the composition of the incoming legislature.1 78 This is known as the seats/votes ratio.1 79 More specifically,
while Democratic candidates received over 50% of the votes, they only
won 43% of the seats.18 0 For those who support the electoral outcome
at issue in Bandemer, this is another way of asking what exactly is wrong
with a redistricting outcome where the party with the most votes does
not get the most seats, especially in a world of single-member legislative districting? Looking specifically to the facts in Bandemer, why
must 51.9% of the voters necessarily garner over 50% of the seats?
Two easy answers are often provided to this question. First, critics respond that under a single-member districting system, the fairest way to
allot seats is in proportion to the votes cast. For this reason, the claim
is often made that once courts begin to inquire into redistricting matters, the only logical stopping point will be a system of proportional
requiring new districts every ten years to correspond with new census figures. Of
course, one may advocate a middle road, with a role for the Court in redistricting
cases up until Reynolds and like cases, but not for gerrymandering controversies "commonly understood." One could thus argue that the Court must ensure "equality"
through the Fourteenth Amendment short of tackling gerrymandering questions
head on. This may be Professor Schuck's point. Advocating this point requires a very
nuanced defense of Baker and Reynolds, but not Bandemer. To my mind, however,
Baker and Bandemer are one and the same, thus rendering any such defense quite
difficult, perhaps impossible. If Baker raises justiciable questions, to put this point
differently, so must Bandemer.
178 See Richard G. Niemi, The Relationship Between Votes and Seats: The Ultimate Question in Political Gernymandering, 33 UCLA L. REv. 185, 191-95 (1985).
179 For a sampling of the myriad difficulties raised by this particular measure, see,
for example, id. at 201-10. See also BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 45, at 58 (explaining
that percentages, standing alone, tell us very little; one needs baseline strength to
gauge gerrymandering in order to account for, inter alia, ticket splitting). Courts and
commentators alike pay a great deal of attention to this measure. See, e.g., Bandemer
v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1491-92 (S.D. Ind. 1984), rev'd, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). This
is not to say, to be clear, that this relationship is a good measure of political fairness.
Standing alone, it is far from it. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 159-60 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW 178-79
(2d ed. 2001); Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative
Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 49-64 (1985).
180 Bandemer, 603 F. Supp. at 1485.
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representation.' 8 ' Second, a frequent response finds refuge in elementary democratic theory. Put simply, a majority of voters must ipso
facto control a majority of seats. This argument does not get any simpler than that.
But things are never as simple as often made out to be. Going
back to the facts at issue in Bandemer, the numbers themselves do not
interest me as much as the process by which the districts at issue came
into being. In other words, how was the Republican Party able to capture a majority of both state houses as well as the governor's office in
1980? The answer is easy: blame on this score may be laid at the feet
of the Reagan landslide of 1980. For a swing state, which Indiana is
considered to be, 18 2 capturing all major elective offices is no small
feat. And yet, after it happened, the Republicans were fortunate to
reap short-term rewards for their efforts.
The key, of course, is that the rewards were "short term." The
Republicans redrew the district lines in 1981, and then a new election
took place the next year. And puzzlingly, in this next election, the
Democrats made an expected comeback (Indiana is a swing state, after all) and received over 50% of the votes. It is on the strength of this
one election that the plaintiffs argued in Bandemer that their rights
had been infringed. I respond to this position in two ways.
First, and as the facts in Bandemer clearly demonstrate, redistricting and the ratio between seats and votes is subject to the ebbs and
flows of democratic politics and political participation. In 1980 the
Indiana Republicans were able to sweep their state, yet by 1982 the
Democratic party had not only recovered but had also overcome their
adversaries at the polls. This case study raises some very interesting
questions. What, for example, should have taken place in 1982 once
the Democrats had received over 50% of the vote? Or, what should
have taken place prior to that in the 1981 redistricting? To answer the
second question, some critics argue that the redistricting process
should be "conducted at a safe distance from the immediate demands
of the political process,"' 8 3 whether by delegating the responsibility to
blue-ribbon commissions,18 4 special masters, or, inter alia, by precommitting redistricters through the development of ex ante redistricting
181

See Bandeme; 478 U.S. at 155-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Sanford Levin-

son, Gerymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Representation: Why
Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 257, 277-78 (1985); Schuck, supra note 15, at

1331.
182 See Bandemer, 603 F. Supp. at 1485.
183 Issacharoff, supra note 157, at 1691.
184 See, e.g.,
McKA', supra note 20, at 269-71; DIXON, supra note 33, at 10; Ely,
supra note I], at 634-35; Issacharoff, supra note 157, at 1691-95.

2003)

DOING

OUR

POLITICS IN

COURT

formulae. 1 85 This Section does not quibble with these proposals and
might even welcome them; my general position assumes instead that
legislators will continue to be in charge of state and congressional redistricting. The first question presents a much more difficult scenario. In 1982, the Democratic victory at the polls led most observers to
conclude that the Democrats must ipso facto receive a legislative majority. Yet, upon closer inspection, it is not clear to me why that
should be the case. In order to see this new possibility, imagine a
factual scenario where, instead of a Democratic victory under a newly
devised Republican plan, as in the Bandemer situation, we instead witness a string of Republican majorities at the polls. Then, in 1988, and
riding on the coattails of a Democratic landslide similar to Reagan's in
1980, the Indiana Democrats garner 60% of the statewide vote. What
should be the outcome of this election? Would we expect the Indiana
legislature to be reflective of this new electoral majority?
Of course we would not. Under our single-member districting
system, the expectation is not that electoral outcomes will be immediately reflected in legislative membership but, instead, that electoral
lines will be drawn every ten years, lines that will serve as ground rules
for all subsequent electoral clashes. Neutral lines are unavailing, and
a line moved an inch to the left or to the right on the map may determine whether the resultant plan will favor one party over another.
Yet, if we really wished for legislative membership to be reflective of
each and every election, we would have a very different system than
the one we have; we would have a proportional representation system
where legislative seats would be awarded to parties anew after every
election. 18 6 Instead, under our system, some tendency towards the re8 7
sult we see in Bandemer is inevitable.1
185 See Issacharoff, supra note 157, at 1664-69.
186 See Andrea Bierstein, Millennium Approaches: The Future of the Voting Rights Act
After Shaw, De Grandy, and Holder, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1457, 1527-32 (1995) (making
such an argument for the adoption of a proportional representation system); Cain,
supra note 20, at 225 (suggesting that proportionality would require abandoning the
district-based system, but that "partisan disagreements over redistricting are an enormous nuisance, causing unnecessary partisan rancor and wasting much time [and are
likely not] more harmful than that"); Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right To Vote,
44 EMORY L.J. 869, 908 (1995) ("[E]qui-populational districting [has] become ... the

peculiar means for interest representation."); Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme Court
Destabilization of Single-Member Districts, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205 passim (explaining
that single-member districts are a difficult way to carry out the Court's promise, postReynolds, of fair and effective representation).
187 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting:Drawing ConstitutionalLines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 588, 638-39 (1993) ("That
districting wastes votes, the Court appears to think, is the price we pay for democracy
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Second, the actual figures in Bandemer (51.9% of the vote, 43% of
the seats), without more information, are quite unimpressive. It is curious that debates over the necessity of judicial intervention arise simply on the strength of these facts.' 8 1 Yet, to demand a different result
in Indiana after the 1982 election, and in light of the 1980 election
and the Republican wave, is to ask a great deal of redistricters and
those in charge of crunching the numbers and manning the computers. This criticism implicitly demands a districting plan exquisitely
sensitive to electoral nuances and flows. In light of our ten-year census counts and traditional reapportionment and redistricting requirements, such a system would be both difficult to attain and perhaps

American-style. No system is perfect. Majority rule creates losers and winners, and
our system has tolerated the routine creation of losers with remarkable equanimity."
(footnote omitted)).
188 For the district court in Bandemer, these numbers made all the difference in
the world. See, e.g., Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1485-86 (S.D. Ind. 1984),
rev'd, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). The court wrote, for example,
Most significant among these many statistical figures is the fact that in 1982
Democratic candidates for the Indiana House earned 51.9 percent of all
votes cast across the state. However, only 43 Democrats were elected to seats.
The State argues that it is possible that this disparity is explained by the
Republicans fielding better candidates or other factors which make the outcome of such elections sensitive to the interests of the voters and the issues
of the day. The Court would readily concede this possibility, but the disparity between the percentage of votes and the number of seats won is, at the
very least, a signal that Democrats may have been unfairly disadvantaged by
the redistricting.
Id. at 1485. On the strength of these figures, the district court concluded that "there
[was] a built-in bias favoring the majority party." Id. at 1486.
In reference to Karcher v. Daggett, commentators similarly argue that the New
Jersey legislature had been able "to concoct a fierce partisan gerrymander." Lani
Guinier & Pamela S. Karlan, The MajoritarianDifficulty: One Person, One Vote, in REASON
AND PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN'S ENDURING INFLUENCE

207, 215 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz

& Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997). From this description, one would expect a complete
Democratic domination as reflected in the 1982 congressional delegation. The numbers, however, are not quite as promising. In 1982, the Democratic Party received
56% of the vote, while the Republican Party received 43%. See AMERICA VOTES 15: A
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ELECTION STATISTICS

235 (Richard M. Scam-

mon & Alice v. McGillivray eds., 1983). Out of fourteen available seats, and all things
being equal, one would expect the Democrats to gain eight of those seats to the
Republicans' six. In actuality, and in specific light of this "fierce gerrymander," the
Democrats gained nine seats to the Republicans' five (under the 1984 plan, interestingly, the Democrats did gain eight seats, the Republicans six). All the hoopla and
contention is over one seat. For all its fierceness, New Jersey redistricters still have a
lot to learn.
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undesirable.1 9 Furthermore, elections are always concerned with the
representation of interests, with winning and losing in the sense that
victories lead to spoils, defeats lead to further planning for future
combat. If this is true, the question in Bandemer then becomes a qualitative one: what happened to the Indiana public in the two years between 1980 and 1982, and how may this change of position be
reflected in such a short term? 90 Again, it remains unclear whether
such reflection is either possible or desirable. Keeping in mind the
larger end of political representation, it is clear that the relevant
means are both contestable and imperfect. Numbers alone, however,
do not tell the whole story.
2.

A Tainted Process

A second objection may be directed instead to the process that
led to the enactment of the challenged plans. In Bandemer,for example, we have a "fiercely competitive and unashamedly partisan" redistricting fight.19 1 This was a process where the minority party was
granted very little access and influence. Further, the adopted plan
was introduced on the last day of the legislative session, which gave
the minority party very little time to review a great mass of information. Put simply, this process was a total legislative railroading, a plan
enacted by the majority party for its maximum benefit. 192 As a state
senator candidly commented in light of this plan, "I don't make goals
for the opposite team."1 93 The challenged plan in Karcher was similarly partisan, as evidenced by a letter from Speaker Christopher Jackman to Ernest Reock, the Director of the Bureau of Government
Research at Rutgers University, in response to a submission by Profes189 See Richard G.Niemi & Laura R. Winsky, The Persistence of PartisanRedistricting
Effects in CongressionalElections in the 1970s and 1980s, 54J. POL. 565, 571 (1992).
190 Bandemer, 603 F. Supp. at 1502 (Pell, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 1484.
192 The court noted,
The challenged plan was the product of the majority party's application of
computer technology to the task of mapmaking. The minority party was
wholly excluded from the mapmaking process which culminated in the present district lines. Only in the final hours of the legislative session were the
details of the plan revealed to the members of the minority party. Minuscule
time was available for the plan to be scrutinized, and its import debated.
Rather, the minority party was intentionally precluded from participating in
the process by which the present plan was drawn up. Clearly, such a procedure is in degradation of the constitutional norm of fair, effective and equal
representation.
Id. at 1495 (citations omitted).
193 Id. at 1484 (quoting deposition testimony of Indiana Senator Charles Bosma).
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sor Reock of a "'model' redistricting proposal. 1 94 According to the
district court, this was a "remarkable reply.' 9 5 Its substance makes
fairly clear that, as the Speaker wrote, "apportionment is a political
process. No apologies need be made for interests which exist and the
pressures which bear upon those who are burdened with the decisions
of apportionment."1 96 The final map, according to the dissenting
judge, "leaves me, as a citizen of New Jersey, disturbed."' 97 In sum,
the legislative majority, like their counterparts in Indiana, wished to
redistrict their state in order to accomplish very partisan goals.
These stories lead commentators to decry the evils of gerrymandering in general and to call for judicial intervention. Sam Issacharoff, for example, writes that Bandemer presents an example of
"the very real problem of capture and manipulation of districts endemic to the reapportionment process."' 9 8 Similar criticisms are leveled at the New Jersey plan. 99 In response, one may argue that the
Reock plan in New Jersey is in fact a fair plan and that the legislature
would have been well served in adopting it. All the same, the New
Jersey example does not present a convincing case for judicial intervention. The way things stand, with legislatures placed at the helm of
redistricting controversies, the results in New Jersey and Indiana are
inevitable.' ° Those wishing for a different process are wishing instead for a different system altogether. This Article would not criticize
any such proposals; in fact, it might even embrace them. But that is a
separate debate altogether. Looking specifically to the state legislatures during the redistricting process, it is hard to chastise them for
behaving as rational actors, especially when the end result accomplishes the goal of electoral representation as well as it does.
3.

Targeting Discretes and Insulars

A third objection posits the claim that partisan gerrymandering is
but a kind of invidious discrimination against parties. Justice Stevens
194 See Daggett v. Kimmelman, 535 F. Supp. 978, 981-82 (D.N.J. 1982) (recounting Reock's plan and the legislative response to it).
195 Id. at 981.
196 Id. at 990 (App. B).
197 Id. at 984 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
198 Issacharoff, supra note 157, at 1687.
199 See, e.g., Guinier & Karlan, supra note 188, at 214-16.
200 The point here is not simply that the minority party was shut out of the process
completely, for such is the fate of political minorities. Rather, the loudest objections
are directed at the structures that would allow such captures in the first place, particularly for questions deemed as important as redistricting.
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makes this point often, dating back to his dissenting opinion, as an
appellate court judge, in Cousins v. City Council.20 1 As he wrote,
As a matter of principle, invidious discrimination against Americans
of Polish, German, or Italian ancestry is just as indefensible as discrimination against Americans of African ancestry. It seems equally
clear that such discrimination against Catholics, Jews, Protestants or
Mormons is in the same category. Unquestionably the same rules
must be applied to the classification of voters on grounds of national origin, ethnicity, or religion, as race. It can be demonstrated
that political groups are also entitled to equal treatment. 20 2
In other words, when a party in control of the redistricting process acts against its competing party, it is discriminating against its
competitor because of its partisan status, not in spite of it. In fact, this
claim may be pressed much further; the goal is to permanently crush
the opposition into submission, to gain a palpable and enduring political advantage. The doctrinal point, on this view, is that any group,
including major political parties, is deserving of judicial protection. 213
This Section responds to this position in two ways.
First, it sides with Justice O'Connor when she writes in Bandemer
that the major political parties will be able to take care of themselves.
The prohibition against targeting groups, which dates back to United
States v. Carolene Products'sfamous Footnote Four,2 0 4 is concerned that
minority groups will not be able to defend themselves in the political
process. The worry, in other words, is not a general one about harming and targeting groups; it is instead a worry that some groups, when
targeted, will not be able to protect themselves and thus will need the
judiciary to intervene on their behalf.20 5 Without question, this is not
201 466 F.2d 830, 847-61 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202 Id. at 850. For another example, see Justice Stevens's dissent in Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630, 676-79 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203 A leading commentator reads the Court's opinion in Bandemerexactly this way.
See Lowenstein, supra note 168, at 74-89.
204 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
205

The Court explained in Strauder v. West Virginia, for example,

If in those States where the colored people constitute a majority of the entire
population a law should be enacted excluding all white men from jury service, thus denying to them the privilege of participating equally with the
blacks in the administration ofjustice, we apprehend no one would be heard
to claim that it would not be a denial to white men of the equal protection of
the laws. Nor if a law should be passed excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen, would there be any doubt of its inconsistency with the spirit of the
amendment.
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
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the case when we look to the redistricting arena and major political
parties.
Second, gerrymandering cases are not about targeting in the
traditional sense. 20 6 In Bandemer, for example, the legislature was
clearly motivated by a desire to protect as many incumbents as possi20 8
ble. 20 7 , A similar motivation arises from the process in New Jersey.
In this way, it is simply a function of zero-sum games that my gain is
your loss and vice versa. Thus, to benefit Republicans within a state,
by definition, is to harm Democrats. Any other result is simply
unavailing.
What, however, to make of Gomillion v. Lightfoot 20 9 and race cases
in general? If Bandemeris not about targeting but partisanship, then is
not Gomillion similarly about race and not about targeting any specific

group? One must respond to this argument gingerly. Put simply, a
cursory look at the facts and social circumstances in Tuskegee in the
late 1950s and early 1960s demonstrates that the Alabama legislature
in 1957 was targeting black residents, and only them, for exclusion.
The history of race relations in Alabama and the efforts by whites
there to keep blacks from voting make a very strong case for exactly
this conclusion. 210 We know that Gomillion is about targeting the way
we know that Jim Crow in general is about targeting as well. Political
21
parties cannot make a similar claim. '
206 See Larry Alexander, Lost in the Political Thicket, 41 FLA. L. REV. 563, 577-78
(1989) (advocating judicial restraint in political gerrymandering cases because "no
demonstrable harm results from gerrymandering regardless of its motivation").
207 See Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1484 (S.D. Ind. 1984), rev'd, 478 U.S.
109 (1986).
208 See Daggett v. Kimmelman, 535 F. Supp. 978, 989 app. B (D.NJ. 1982).
209 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
210 See ALA. CONST. amend. 132 (1957), repealed by ALA. CONST. amend. 406 (1982)
(amending the state constitution in order to abolish Macon County altogether if necessary); United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677 (M.D. Ala. 1961), affd, 304 F.2d
583 (5th Cir. 1962), affd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962) (per curiam). This amendment was
adopted, as some residents told Bernard Taper in 1960, in case "the uppity Negroes
[in Macon County] continued pestering for the vote." BERNARD TAPER, GOMILLION
VERSUS LIGHTFOOT 51 (1962).
211 Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Bandemer agrees with this point. In her
view, politics is a contact sport, and so long as major political parties are engaged in
the battle, democracy need not be worried. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144
(1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Of course, she takes her claim further and argues
that these claims are never justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. In his
concurring opinion in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,Justice Brennan made an
analogous claim, one that ultimately reinforces my position here.

430 U.S. 144,

168-72 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring). As he wrote, to condone political gerrymandering (or "political-party apportionment") is not to condone racial gerryman-
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Rigging Outcomes and the Perils of the Redistricting Craft

A fourth objection raised against the partisan gerrymander worries about "perpetual" losers and their inability to affect the political
process in light of their minority status. The claim is simply that legislators will be able to cement their majority status ad infinitum thanks
largely to their control of the redistricting process. For support, one
may offer the examples of Tennessee and Alabama prior to 1962 and
2 12
the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr.
The point is quite valid in the abstract. In practice, however, the
internal checks in the redistricting system guard against permanent,
or long-lasting representative lockouts. In our system, states are required to redraw their district lines every ten years with the advent of
new census figures. In this way, the process ideally reflects the political reality on the ground, as people shift from one state to the next,
from one part of the state to another. For those in charge of the actual line drawing, they are given one shot to affect the politics of their
state for the next ten years. This shot is not randomly assigned, but is
a reflection of their political power at a predetermined point in the
continuum. For those who worry about this condition, whether a
party or an interest group or legislators in general, they could always
make the upcoming redistricting into a campaign issue. 2 13 In this
vein, the better the gerrymander, the better chance that this will be an
issue of any salience to prospective voters. 214 Yet, so long as the facts
dering. Id. at 171 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring). In his own words, "Political
affiliation is the keystone of the political trade. Race, ideally, is not." Id. (Brennan,J.,
concurring). To be sure, it will sometimes be difficult to sort racial from political
considerations. These times will require decisionmakers to exercise due care. See also
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 235-36 (2001) (discussing the role that considerations of race play in boundary-drawing and considering the correlation between race
and political behavior).
212 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
213

See BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 45, at 4; L. Karen Darner, In Northern Virginia,

PoliticalChallenges Mark House RedistrictingTalks, WASH. POST (ALEXANDRIA-ARLINGTON
EXTRA), Apr. 26, 2001, at 4. Darner wrote,
I will be the first to recognize that 10 years ago, the Democratic plan had
faults based on partisanship. We all know how successful the Democrats
were with their 1991 plan to keep a majority of House and Senate seats. In
addition to losing the majority in both houses, our arrogance gave birth to
George Allen the governor.
Darner, supra.
214 The infamous gerrymandering in Massachusetts provides a pertinent illustration. In the early 1800s, Massachusetts could have been labeled a Federalist state. In
1811, Republicans gained control of all three branches of the state government. They
then set about the task of redistricting their state, a process that produced the infa-
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in Baker do not repeat themselves, where legislators lock themselves in
power in perpetuity and refuse to redraw district lines in the face of
clear shifts in population, the redistricting battles should be allowed
to play themselves out.
Further, who are these "perpetual" losers, especially in the context of partisan gerrymandering? If the claim is that a party can subjugate another for a very long time, both major parties will be more
than able to take care of themselves.2 1 5 Further, and as Peter Schuck
writes, the "motive to gerrymander is considerably stronger than [the]
ability to execute and sustain one."2

16

The argument for permanent

domination of the political process by one party over another assigns
to the gerrymanderer a great deal of ingenuity and savvy, sprinkled
with a great deal of luck. To put the point mildly, the redistricting
process involves many factors and circumstances, some of which are
out of the reach of the person entrusted with drawing the actual lines.
For example, a gerrymanderer mustjuggle with the uncertainty inherent in the redistricting process; must be careful to keep its plan politically low key, lest she incur an electoral backlash in future elections;
must waste votes across districts, one way or another, and thus must
attempt to forecast future elections, turnouts and the like in order to
ensure the desired outcome; must balance partisan gains from a redistricting plan with the cost of a much more polarized legislature; and,
inter alia, must take a position on the question of what percentage of
the voting public within a district makes a seat a "safe" one. 2 17 To
mous salamander map that gave rise to the term "gerrymander." The map was highly
successful in terms of benefiting the Republican party. While the Federalists gar-

nered a majority of votes, they only won 37% of the legislative seats. See

GEORGE

323
(1976). Two points are of interest to me. First, "[t]he gerrymander law aroused a
furor and split the political parties still further." Id. at 317. That is to say, the opposing party did not take its defeat silently but instead raised its complaints publicly.
Second, due partly to this redistricting issue and partly to other considerations, Gerry
lost the governorship to Caleb Strong by 1200 out of over 100,000 votes cast. See id. at
323.
215 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
ATHAN BILLIAS, ELBRIDGE GERRY: FOUNDING FATHER AND REPUBLICAN STATESMAN

216
217

Schuck, supra note 15, at 1345.
See BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 45, at 1-16; BRUCE A. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 148-54 (1984); Schuck, supra note 15, at 1341-44. In the context of
minority-majority districts, for example, researchers argue as to the percentage that

will in fact ensure a safe seat. Compare DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION 45-54 (1997) (arguing that a safe seat is reached with only 55% of registered
voters), with Charles Cameron et al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize. Substantive
Black Representation in Congress?, 90 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 794, 794 (1996) (lowering Lublin's figure to 47%). For a terrific discussion of the political science data concerning
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conclude, political losers are seldom, if ever, losers in perpetuity; the
process is far too complex for that.
5.

On the Need for Electoral Competition

A final objection to the political gerrymander complains that
under a well-crafted plan, elections are a sham, the incumbents in
question shielded away from true competition. Professors Issacharoff
and Pildes, leading exponents of this position, 218 put this point characteristically well, as they write, "Only through an appropriately competitive partisan environment can one of the central goals of
democratic politics be realized: that the policy outcomes of the political process be responsive to the interests and views of citizens." 219 On
this view, competition lies at the heart of our electoral system.
This view has much to commend it. To be sure, one would be
hard pressed to argue against a view of elections as providing voters
with a slate of candidates from which to choose their preferred representative. All the same, three responses merit careful consideration,
responses that lead me, as before, to argue for a lessened judicial role
in political matters.
The first response looks to the notion of constitutional pluralism
and points to the many values often reflected during the redistricting
process and beyond. On this account, a redistricting plan meets constitutional proscriptions when and if it reflects any of a number of
well-settled democratic norms, such as majority rule, electoral representation and responsiveness, to name a few. 220 It is quite clear that

electoral competition must be catalogued under any such list. Far
more important is the fact that a redistricting plan cannot possibly
reflect all values, for some of these values lie in tension with others; 22 1
choices must be made. To be clear, this first response is by no means
intended as a criticism of the "competition" model. Rather, it is a
concession to the strength of its democratic pedigree as situated
district percentages necessary for black voters to elect a black candidate, see Pildes,
supra note 25, at 1529-39.
218 See Issacharoff, supra note 163, at 94-95. See generally Issacharoff & Pildes,
supra note 14 (arguing that courts should aim to eliminate artificial barriers to political competition); Pildes, supra note 4, at 1606-07 (discussing the theory of political
competition and certain characteristics of constraints thereon).
219 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 14, at 646.
220 See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflec-

tions on the InterpretiveApproach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1142-43 (2002).
221 See Persily et al., supra note 73, at 1320-21 (arguing that an inherent tension
exists between the values of competition and electoral responsiveness).
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within the larger electoral context. Put differently, it is clear that electoral competition is a value worth pursuing, yet not the only one.

The second response focuses on what may be the most damning
implication of this objection: the lack of accountability and electoral
responsiveness. This argument lies at the heart of the argument in
favor of electoral competition. For example, "[t] hrough reducing the
prospect of challenge, elected officials act as monopolists who create
significant entry barriers and then exact monopoly rents. The more
secure their hold on power, the more existing officeholders are free
to pursue their own interests rather than interests of their constituents"; "[t] here is little normative justification for permitting the sinecure of an entrenched, unaccountable minority that cannot be
222
dislodged through the normal operation of the political process."
Curiously, this particular argument often stands alone, devoid of
much support. 223 Yet, the available evidence is far more promising
222 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 14, at 709; Issacharoff, supra note 163, at 95. In
a recent work, Professor Issacharoff asks whether a legislature could do away with
elections altogether and decide by itself who returns to the legislature in the next
session, and who stays home. He analogizes this argument to the current state of
most legislative elections across the country, as the number of safe, noncompetitive
seats is quite high. See Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 22-27, 33-35. This position assigns to the elections themselves very little weight, a point amply refuted by much of
the available evidence. See, e.g., David W. Brady et al., Differences in Legislative Voting
Behavior Between Winning and Losing House Incumbents, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN
HOUSE ELECTIONS, supra note 42, at 178, 181-89 (arguing that elections hold repre-

sentatives accountable and that those who take extreme positions vis-A-vis their district's preferences increase their probability of electoral defeat); Robert S. Erkson &
Gerald C. Wright, Representation of Constituency Ideology in Congress, in CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE IN HOUSE ELECTIONS, supra note 42, at 177 ("Overall, members heed the

general policy preferences of their constituents; they lose votes-and sometimes elections-if they stray too far ideologically."); id. at 150 ("[M]embers tend to represent
the mean or median ideological position of their districts, and do so in direct proportion to their electoral insecurity. They do so for good reason, as constituencies often
will turn incumbents out of office when they are ideologically unresponsive."). Elections matter in the eyes of the electorate, even for those seats that appear noncompetitive to the outside observer. It is for this reason that doing away with elections would
seriously violate important democratic norms in ways that noncompetitive elections
do not.
223 For example, Professors Issacharoff and Pildes cite Professor Daniel Ortiz for
support. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 15, at 709 n.272 (citing Daniel R. Ortiz,
Federalism, Reapportionment, and Incumbency: Leading the Legislature To Police Itself, 4 J.L.

& POL. 653, 675 (1988)). Professor Ortiz develops this particular point as follows,
By redrawing district lines in such a way as to favor their own reelection,
incumbents can partially protect themselves from challenge. They can then
pursue their self-interests at the expense of their constituents' interests with
less fear of being unseated. The smaller their fear, moreover, the more
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than they allow. The debate over the hated gerrymander as traditionally carried out is at its core a debate about the concept of representation. And on this point, judicial doctrine, and particularly its passive
approach to gerrymandering questions, stands on firm ground. I have
already presented some of the evidence from political science above.
Arguments from political theory are also unhelpful. After all, the concept of representation is devoid of clear definitions, 224 thus making
arguments about lack of representation quite difficult to make. Further, it is surely right that the move from direct political participation
to a system of representation immediately compromises our political
freedom and autonomy. 225 More specifically, nobody could fully re-

present every member of a group, be it an interest group or the inhabitants of a congressional district. The question of representation is
thus a question of degree, not as facile as often implied by the tenor of
the criticisms against modern redistricting practices.
The third response returns to the thesis at the heart of this Article: whether the Court must step in and influence these highly
politicized controversies. This Article argues that the Court should.
In making this point, it proves instructive to keep in mind the stakes
of the redistricting process and the dimensions of the political
infighting witnessed therein. The "politics-as-markets" model offers a
useful referent, in the context of vote dilution claims:
where there is intense partisan competition, disputes over the relative distribution of political power could be left to democratic politroom they have to indulge their own preferences and ignore the voterseven the majority who elected them.
Daniel R. Ortiz, Federalism, Reapportionment, and Incumbency: Leading the Legislature to
Police Itself, 4J.L. & POL. 653, 675 (1988). As should be clear from the text, this is a

curious argument. To begin, it is not clear whether elected officials are able to protect themselves from challenge through redistricting to the degree this argument envisions. Further, the bulk of the evidence on this issue points in the opposite
direction: the rise of the personal vote has meant that members of Congress spend
more of their time on constituency matters, not less. See, e.g., BRUCE E. CAIN ET AL.,
THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITUENCY SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE passim
(1987) (arguing that partisan decline has led to rise of constituency service, personal
appeal and recognition as ensuring reelection); MAYHEW, supra note 88, at 49-59,
121-22 (contending that congressional members care about individual positions in
relation to the sentiment of their districts, but do not care quite so much, if at all,
about policy outcomes); John A. Ferejohn, On the Decline of Competition in Congressional
Elections, 71 A-M. POL. Sci. REv. 166, 175 (1977) (defending the view that electoral
defeat is due to neglect in matters of constituency service, not to issue positions).
Finally, it is not altogether clear how a legislator may be so safe from electoral repercussions as to ignore a majority of voters within her district.
224
225

See PITKIN, supra note 12, at 4-6.
See WOLFF, supra note 90, at 27-34.
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ics itself-rival factions would presumably compete for excluded
blocs of voters. The very difficulty of defining "dilution" justifies
limiting the judicial role to ensuring a robust competitive
environment.

226

This Article agrees. So long as the political process remains vibrant and competitive between rival factions, the federal courts must
play a secondary role. This argument is structural in scope: to overturn redistricting plans on the strength of a value of political competition-a value for which a working definition proves quite
difficult 227 -would amount to a backdoor fine-tuning irrespective of
prior commitments. Such an approach raises the specter of Bush v.
Gore228 quite strongly, for the Court would in essence be asked to proffer its preferred view of political fairness ahead of the views of those
institutions entrusted with such duties. To put this point a different
way, the political process is "an independent system charged with
choosing the appropriate ends of government."2 2 9 We must either let
the process run its course or amend it on our own. The one thing we
must clearly do is stop asking the federal courts to do the heavy lifting.
III.

THE NEW POLITICS OF RACE: RACE QUESTIONS

AS

POLITICAL QUESTIONS

The previous Part questioned the ease with which critics assail
partisan gerrymanders and ultimately concluded that judicial intervention in this area should be guarded at best. This next Part extends
this position to the concept of racial gerrymandering and particularly
to those gerrymanders borne out of the 1990s redistricting process,
what Mark Monmonier has labeled "Bushmanders." 230 This Part
agrees that the Court has a special role to play when examining racial
gerrymanders. However, it contends that the modern racial gerry2 31
mander is better understood as a type of political gerrymander.
226

Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 14, at 702. In the most recent redistricting

cycle, for example, the early results point to the conclusion that the parties managed
to battle one another to a draw. See Alison Mitchell, Redistricting 2002 Produces No
Great Shakeups, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at A20.
227 See Richard L. Hasen, The "PoliticalMarket" Metaphor and Election Law: A Comment on Issacharoffand Pildes, 50 STAN. L. REv. 719, 724-28 (1998); Persily et al., supra
note 73, at 1315 ("The 'preordination' of an election is really what makes it noncompetitive, but that phenomenon turns out to be a very tricky one to describe and to
measure.").

228
229

531 U.S. 98 (2000).
Fitts, supra note 4, at 1123.

230

MONMONIER, supra note 36, at 1-12.

231

See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 245 (2001).
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Furthermore, this area is partially governed by federal law, specifically
by the Voting Rights Act. 232 For these reasons, this Part similarly con-

cludes that courts should not examine these plans as aggressively as it
233
did during the 1990s.

A.

The Voting Rights Act, Vote Dilution and the Gingles Test

Those in charge of crafting new district lines must pay attention
to many different factors. Some of these are statutory requirements
stemming from their particular state constitutions. Demands for contiguity, compactness and preservation of pre-existing political subdivisions are often included in this list.234 Redistricters must also pay

careful attention to the demands of federal law, as codified in the
Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982. This necessity presents them
with a dilemma: while they must pay attention to racial considerations
under section 2 of the Act, the Supreme Court's recent equal protection jurisprudence subjects the use of race to fatal strict scrutiny review. I address this difficulty below. For the purposes of this Section,
I focus here on the redistricting process and particularly the creation
of racial districts.
This story begins with the 1965 enactment of the Voting Rights
Act, as amended in 1982. This is a story best told through the Court's
interpretation of the Act in Thornburg v. Gingles.2 35 In Gingles, the
Court explored whether a particular redistricting plan violated section
2 by providing people of color "less opportunity than other members
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice." 236 To the Court, the statutory inquiry

focuses on the ability of blacks and whites to elect representatives of
232 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973bb (2000).
233 Critics of the wrongful districting cases point out that the Court does not police partisan gerrymandering meaningfully, yet does so while interpreting the relevant
provisions of the Voting Rights Act, as well as in racial gerrymandering cases under
Shaw. In doing so, the Court invites disappointed partisans to turn to the courts to
overturn their losses. See Issacharoff, supra note 11 (manuscript at 46-55, on file with
author); Sally Dworak-Fisher, Note, Drawingthe Line on Incumbency Protection, 2 MICH.J.
RACE & L. 131, 156-59 (1996). This Article agrees with this assessment. The main
difference between these critics and this Article is their call for more judicial intervention, while this Article calls for a lessened judicial role, in order to discourage these
disappointed partisans from turning to the courts to secure more favorable plans.
234 See, e.g.,
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(a) ("Legislative Districts shall be compact, contiguous and substantially equal in population. Representative Districts shall be com-

pact, contiguous, and substantially equal in population.").
235
236

478 U.S. 30 (1986).
Id. at 36.
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their choice. 237 In the Court's words, "[t]he essence of a section 2
claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts
with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred
representatives."' 238 Thus, the query: when do these inequalities in
electoral opportunities arise?
In general, these inequalities are likely to arise through the use of
multimember districts. This is not to say that the use of these districts
is statutorily suspect, the Court made clear, 23 9 but to say instead that
their use, coupled with three preconditions, will likely lead to a statutory violation.2 40 The preconditions are now well known and require
little discussion. First, the minority group must demonstrate that it is
large enough to be able to form a majority in a single-member district.2 4 1 Second, the group must be politically cohesive. 242 And third,
plaintiffs must show the existence of racial bloc voting. 2 43 When these

three conditions are met, a court must then ask "whether the totality
of facts, including those pointing to proportionality, show[] that the
new scheme would deny minority voters equal political opportunity." 244 If so, section 2 demands the use of race in the formation of
2 45
new districts that will effectuate the promise of the Act.

This is an important point, often lost in contemporary debates.
Modern constitutional doctrine demands the application of strict
scrutiny review whenever the state classifies persons along racial
lines. 246 Some commentators extend this proposition to racial districting. 24 7 Yet, it is also true that the state must take racial characteristics

into account or risk violating federal law. As such, redistricters face a
Id. at 47.

237
238
239

Id.
Id. at 48.

240
241
242

Id. at 48-51.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 51.

243 Id.
244 Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013-14 (1994) (citation omitted) (construing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 30).
245 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44.
246 Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
247 See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Racial Gerrymanderingand Vote Dilution: Shaw v.
Reno in DoctrinalContext, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 517 (1995); Katharine Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Rhetoric and Reality, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 313 (1995-1996). For
a strong and persuasive rebuttal, see PeterJ. Rubin, ReconnectingDoctrine and Purpose:
A ComprehensiveApproach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1
(2000).
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difficult conundrum; while they must take note of race in crafting
their district lines, they must be careful while doing so lest they risk
offending modern equal protection principles. In fact, to many influential commentators, the use of race in redistricting is central to our
quest for "fair representation."

' 248

This Section does not reach any definitive conclusions on this
important debate. Rather, it is descriptive in nature; that is, seven
members of the Court seem to agree that the state must use race in
redistricting. 249 Yet, it is also true that sometimes the state goes too
far. Clearly, Gomillion may be catalogued under the rubric of "going
too far.". What to make of the more difficult cases presented by the
Bushmanders of the 1990s, when race played a central role and the
resulting districts were of dubious shapes? In other words, how does
Gomillion compare to its doctrinal cousin, if a distant one, Shaw v.
Reno? 250 Quite clearly, they are not the same case. The balance of this

Part takes up and defends this crucial distinction.
B.

The World According to Shaw

In Shaw, the question presented is whether the infamously bizarre District 12251 violated constitutional norms. The history of the
case up to 1993 convinces me that it does not. Before turning to the
specific facts at issue in Shaw, it is helpful to first offer some needed
reminders. As we know, the Court has generally allowed political actors much discretionary room to devise redistricting plans of their
choice, and to take myriad factors into account.2 52 The reasons for
248

See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 119-56 (1994); A.

Leon

Higginbotham, Jr. et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with Devastating
Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. Riv. 1593, 1644 (1994). But see SWAIN, supra note
74,

at 197-206;

ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND

MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS

193-231 (1987).

249 They include the four dissenters in Shaw plusJustices O'Connor and Kennedy
and Chief Justice Rehnquist. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977-79 (1996)
(O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J.).
250 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
251 See infra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
252 See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1993); Growe v. Emison,
507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975). The Court holds on
to this view even in the face of contradictory signals sent in the wake of Shaw and its
progeny. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915-16 (1995); Bush, 517 U.S. at 978.
But see Miller, 515 U.S. at 949 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Court's disposition
renders redistricting perilous work for state legislatures ....
Genuine attention to
traditional districting practices and avoidance of bizarre configurations seemed,
under Shaw, to provide a safe harbor. In view of today's decision, that is no longer
the case." (citations omitted)); Karlan, supra note 10, at 753 ("Although the courts
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doing so are powerful ones and are reflected in the thesis posited in
this Article. In the abstract, redistricting choices do not pose direct
questions of harm unless evidence of vote dilution or population disparities is found.2 53 No matter which way we carve up a state's area,
some voters will win, others will lose; under our chosen political system, such a result is inevitable. It thus stands to reason that these
voters meet the requisite standing requirements under Article III.
While they have lost something and consider themselves harmed, they
have suffered no more harm under this scenario than do partisans
whose policies fail to gain congressional enactment. 254 Worse yet, allowing these complainants a forum in federal court to raise and debate their grievances would grind our democratic process to a halt
and would make a mockery of our electoral system. All that a citizen
is afforded is a chance to participate in the process, a chance to win
and affect the policies of her liking; one is not afforded the right to
win.
Ruth Shaw was afforded this opportunity when she turned out to
vote in her home district in North Carolina. Prior to this time, the
state had been involved in a redistricting and pre-clearance dialogue
with the DOJ. Once the state legislators completed their partisan effort and produced a plan acceptable to all involved parties, Shaw's
place of residence did not change, nor did her neighbors'. All that
changed, according to the new districting plan, was her voting district.
In a contested Fall election, she voted for Mel Watt, the African-American Democratic candidate running in District 12. Congressman Watt
2 55
carried a majority of votes from that district.
Soon after the election, some North Carolinians (including the
Republican Party) objected to the election results. For these plaintiffs, the issue was not the electoral outcome but the district itself. In
their estimation, the final redistricting plan, under which the election
took place, was an unconstitutional political gerrymander under the
Court's holding in Davis v. Bandemer. The district court disagreed,

pay great lip service to the idea that reapportionment is a core state function whose
inherently political nature 'requires courts to exercise extraordinary caution' before
intervening, the reality seems to belie their protestations." (citation omitted)).
253 See Miller, 515 U.S. at 938-39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Shaw, 509 U.S. at
659-60 (White, J., dissenting).
254 See Miller, 515 U.S. at 929-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Hays,
515 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
255 BiocRAiHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 1774-1996, at 2023 (Joel
D. Treese ed., 1997).
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and so did the Supreme Court.2 56 These plaintiffs, however, were

hardly discouraged. The second time around, they argued not that
the district was politically gerrymandered, but that it was racially gerrymandered, and thus violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. And in this second round of litigation, the Supreme Court partially agreed with them. In Shaw v. Reno, the Court
concluded that a plaintiff may state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause when the districting plan, "though race-neutral on its face,
rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to
separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and ... the
separation lacks sufficient justification."2 5 7 Ruth Shaw, the named

plaintiff in the case, thus managed to defeat her own congressional
choice, not at the ballot box but in the judicial sphere.
In Shaw, the Supreme Court began its excursion into these uncharted waters by conceding that the claims raised there were analytically distinct from previous equal protection claims. 258 This move is
necessary in light of the facts at issue because, as the dissenting faction
has argued loudly and clearly in Shaw and subsequent cases, the plaintiffs are not precluded from voting and the strength of their ballots is
not unconstitutionally diluted in the traditional sense.2 59 This case is
about redistricting, plain and simple, and the combustive arena that
are state legislatures during such trying times. 260 And yet, even the
most cursory of looks at a map of North Carolina's District 12 is sure
to raise many an objection. Put bluntly, District 12 is just plain ugly,
barely contiguous, and the most non-compact of all 435 districts in the
nation. The Justices must have looked at this map and grimaced,
while thoughts of Flast v. Cohen261 filled their heads. 262 Little details,
256 Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992), summarily affd, 506 U.S. 801
(1992). See Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd sub nom. Richards v.
Terrazas, 505 U.S. 1214 (1992), for the original Texas challenge that culminated in
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
257 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649.
258 Id. at 652.
259 Id. at 661-67 (White,J., dissenting); id. at 676 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); id. at

678-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260 For examples of actual redistricting battles in two state legislatures and the
degree to which legislators will go to see their plans enacted into law, see Gelman &
King, supra note 29, at 541. As they write, "[L]egislative redistricting is one of the
most conflictual forms of regular politics in the United States short of violence." Id.
261 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (holding that taxpayers had standing to bring a claim
under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to enjoin expenditures of
federal funds for purchases of textbooks and other instructional materials for use in
parochial schools).
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such as standing issues, could always be sorted out inthe future. The
263
map alone spoke a thousand words.
This same map, however, did not speak in doctrinal terms, so the
hard work of situating its excesses within our constitutional world
proved far more difficult. In Shaw, we clearly see the Court's struggle
with defining the harm at issue, an effort that gave birth to what commentators have labeled the "expressive harms" doctrine. In the words
of its leading theorist, Richard Pildes, "[a]n expressive harm is one
that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material consequences the action brings about."2 64 More specifically, the Shaw
doctrine seeks to ensure that state action reflects the proper "respect
for relevant public values," 265 or, stated negatively, that it does not

represent a disruption of "constitutionally underwritten public understandings about the appropriate structure of values in some arena of
public action."

266

Shaw is directly traced to an attitudinalist discomfort with the
North Carolina map and specifically with the contours of District 12.
Put simply, a cursory glance at the map led a Court majority to the
conclusion that such political displays must be unconstitutional. For
262

They might have thought, "We don't know how, we don't know why, but this

district has got to be unconstitutional, so somebody, anyone, must have standing to

raise the claim." See John Hart Ely, Standing To Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders,
111 HARV. L. REV. 576, 579-80 (1997).
263 See, for example, the discussion during the oral argument for Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999):
MR. EVERETT (counsel for Cromartie): Mr. ChiefJustice, and may it please
the Court: I am back again with a map show and that's because the maps are
a very important part of the history. There are two maps that we're going to
showQUESTION: Well, certainly they are, but I think, at least speaking for myself,
my concern is that there may well have been sufficient evidence here to preclude the court from granting summary judgment on this question. So, I
would be most interested in how you justify that.

MR. EVERETT: Your Honor, we-I think the maps are a key to that. Starting first with the 1992 map, which is over here, which is part of the history
and which was part of the Court's opinion in Shaw v. Reno ....
Oral Argument, Hunt v. Cromartie, 1999 WL 31144, at *27-28. In Cromartie, of
course, the Court relected this argument's simplicity. Cromartie,526 U.S. at 553-54.
And yet, in his next appearance in front of the Court, Cromartie's counsel brought
out, yet again, his various redistricting maps.
264 Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "BizarreDistricts," and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 483, 506-07 (1993).
265 Id. at 507.
266 Id.
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this reason, the opinion itself reads as an after-the-fact rationalization
for the a prioriconclusion that such districts must be unconstitutional.
Shaw may thus be read the same way that commentators traditionally
read Baker: as a call to reform without much helpful guidance. In this
vein, the easiest line of attack has focused along the lines of standing
and traditional constitutional harms. 267 Yet, if the leading rendition
of "expressive harms" doctrine fails to persuade, blame must be directed not at those who struggle to understand this new claim, but at
the Court, which opened up an analytically distinct inquiry without
the requisite thoughtfulness.
C. Gomillion Meets Shaw in Our New Equal Protection World
The conclusions raised to this point will leave the "neutral principles" crowd dissatisfied. In order to press the claim of a lessened judicial role convincingly, what is needed is a doctrinal argument that
distinguishes Gomillion v. Lightfoot,268 the Tuskegee gerrymandering
case of 1960, from Shaw v. Reno, 269 the North Carolina redistricting

controversy begun in 1993. To the critics, these cases are one and the
same, as both of them consider the use of race as a classificatory tool.
This Article disputes this characterization' as much too facile and ultimately unhelpful. More specifically, it responds to the critics in three
ways.
The first response tracks the views of the dissenting Justices in
Shaw. To begin, the majority is right when it argues that Gomillion
offers support for the contention that "district lines obviously drawn
for the purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption." 2 70 The use of race must be carefully scrutinized, no question about it. This is not to say, however, that the use of
267 See Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein, Identifying the Harm in Racial
GerrymanderingClaims, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 47 (1996); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela
S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstandingin Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276
(1998); Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection
from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan, Still
Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287, 311
(1995-96) (criticizing the Court's "inability to articulate and identify a concrete
harm").
268 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
269 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
270 Id. at 645 (emphasis added); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
216 (1944) ("[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect ... [and] courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny.").
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race must always be invalidated absent compelling reasons. While
Gomillion and Shaw must be carefully scrutinized, in other words, they
must be treated differently. As Justice White wrote in his dissent in
Shaw:
In light of this background, it strains credulity to suggest that North
Carolina's purpose in creating a second majority-minority district
was to discriminate against members of the majority group by "impair[ing] or burden[ing their] opportunity ...to participate in the
political process." The State has made no mystery of its intent,
which was to respond to the Attorney General's objections, improving the minority group's prospects of electing a candidate of its
choice. I doubt that this constitutes a discriminatory purpose as defined in the Court's equal protection cases-i.e., an intent to aggra'2 7
vate "the unequal distribution of electoral power." '
272
Justices Stevens and Souter have made similar arguments.
Clearly, race played a role in both Gomillion and Shaw. Their uses,
however, were quite distinct.2 73 The only way the two cases may be
equated is by treating any and all racial classifications similarly and

271 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 666 (White,J., dissenting) (quoting United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 179 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring); Shaw, 509 U.S. at
678 (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see id. at 668-69 (White, J., dissenting).
272 See, e.g.,
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 921 (1995) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (contending that Shaw is not Gomillion); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1054 (1996)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between the issues at stake in Shaw and
Gomillion).
273 In this vein, a skeptic may still argue that Gomillion and Shaw are both dilution
cases, situations where the state simply drew district lines yet did not invidiously harm
any given resident. The facts belie this characterization. In Shaw, the conclusion is
true: North Carolina voters were used as "filler people," and as such were placed in

districts where they would be unable to select the representatives of their choice.
Whether "filler" treatment rises to the level of unconstitutionality is an open question.
Compare Ely, supra note 262, with Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 267. In Gomillion,
however, the plaintiffs were removed from the city limits and "thrust into the unincorporated part of Macon County, while they remained within Tuskegee's three-mile police jurisdiction .... Thus, the response was unavailable that although the Gomillion
plaintiffs could no longer vote in District X-Tuskegee-they could now vote in District Y." Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 267, at 2280 n.25 (citations omitted). In so
doing, the state denied black Tuskegee residents the right to vote. Gomillion is thus
closer to vote denial situations than vote dilution cases. See Reno v. Bossier Parish
Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 335 n.3 (2000) ("Gomillion v. Lightfoot involved a proposal to
redraw the boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama, so as to exclude all but 4 or 5 of its 400
black voters without excluding a single white voter. Our conclusion that the proposal
would deny black voters the right to vote in municipal elections, and therefore violated the Fifteenth Amendment, had nothing to do with racial vote dilution." (citations omitted)).
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disregarding the obvious state purposes behind the given state actions. History and social practices, however, get in the Court's way.2 7 4
The second response presses the distinction between dilution
and invidiousness. That is to say that the focal point of equal protection claims is the concept of invidiousness, what may be termed the
"evil eye" standard. This is the practice found in Gomillion. In Shaw,
conversely, we speak instead of vote dilution, as we must, courtesy of
the Voting Rights Act. The two concepts are not the same. The "evil
eye" standard has a long and unfortunate history and may often be
equated with dilution claims. This is so, it should be clear, because of
Jim Crow, because of our racial history. Departing from the premise
that dilution is inevitable (all redistricting is gerrymandering, after
all), we must be careful when looking for "evil eyes" when in the presence of dilution claims. Absent Jim Crow, political outcomes should
275
be left unmolested.
The third response looks to the state interests in the two cases,
which are dissimilar at best and lead to different results. To begin, the
states should only be required to proffer a legitimate state interest in
order to defend their redistricting choices. 276 The North Carolina
legislature would have very little problem doing so, for it can point to
DOJ and the Voting Rights Act as the reason for the shape of its contested district. 277 This is not to say that section 2 requires a non-compact district, or that section 5 requires the district we ultimately see in
Shaw. It is to say instead that the process that led to the challenged
district is clearly a political process. 278 After the initial challenge by
DOJ under section 5, that is, the previous political compromises
within the state were threatened. The challenged District 12 is thus a
political compromise in that the working legislative majority within
274 See, e.g., Shaw, 509 U.S. at 671 n.7 (White, J., dissenting) ("I borrow the term
,segregate' from the majority, but, given its historical connotation, believe that its use
is ill advised. Nor is it a particularly accurate description of what has occurred. The
majority-minority district that is at the center of the controversy is, according to the
State, 54.71% African-American. Even if racial distribution was a factor, no racial
group can be said to have been 'segregated'-i.e., 'set apart' or 'isolate[d]."' (citations omitted)).
275 Cf, e.g.,Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (holding that there is no

section 2 violation where minority voters form effective voting majorities).
276 See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 2 (arguing for a hardened rational basis test to
evaluate redistricting plans).
277 Cf United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 164-65 (1977) ("New York

adopted the 1974 plan because it sought to comply with the Voting Rights Act. This
has been its primary defense of the plan, which was sustained on that basis by the
Court of Appeals ....

278

[T] he Court of Appeals was essentially correct.").

See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 17, at 261-65.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

78:2

the state sought to preserve its previous gains in the face of yet another constraint added to their equation, in the face of the Voting
Rights Act.
In this vein, whether the Voting Rights Act is a legitimate exercise
of state power is a separate question altogether, a question that may
be laid at the feet of ChiefJustice Warren and South Carolinav. Katzenbach.279 The Alabama legislature in 1957, however, cannot proffer a
similar justification for the shape of the contested district and its effect on the black residents of Tuskegee. In other words, the state ac280
tion in Gomillion fails the same way that it failed in Romer v. Evans,
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,281 and United States Dept. of
Agriculture v. Moreno.282 The desire to harm an unpopular group does
not qualify as a legitimate state interest.
On this argument, few cases will match the result achieved by the
Court in Gomillion.28 3 Such cases will demand great care from the
Court, as well as a thoughtful inquiry into the history and social practices in question. In some important respects, the argument here bor28 4
It
rows much from Professor Lawrence's "cultural meaning" test.

asks for careful inquiries into social history and political context. It
asks, in other words, for thoughtfulness and deliberation. It asks for a
judge to distinguish between Brown v. Board of Education2 85 and historically black colleges, between the blatant use of redistricting lines in
order to keep blacks out of a municipality and the enactment of redistricting lines in order to ensure the election of a black representative.
279 383 U.S. 301 (1966). For discussions of the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act in the face of modern doctrine, see Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and
Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 Wm.& MARY L. REV. 725
(1998); Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 Wm.& MARY
L. REV. 743 (1998); and Pildes, supra note 25, at 1529-39.
280 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
281 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
282 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
283 See Smith v. State Exec. Comm., 288 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga. 1968)); Smith v.
Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Warren Court Crusadefor the Holy Grailof "One Man-One Vote", 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 219, 265 ("As might be
expected, some racial gerrymandering challenges have been successful in the Deep
South where past patterns of racial discrimination may make it easier to reach a conclusion of either racial intent or racial effect, and on a more meager record than in
the North." (citing Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965)).
284 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 355-58 (1987); see also Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A GeneralRestatement, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1503 (2000) (arguing thatjudicial decisionmaking regarding constitutional questions can be best understood as an expression of collective beliefs and attitudes).
285 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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For example, assume a fact situation where the use of at-large
elections serves to effectively eliminate the voting strength of racial
minorities.2 8 6 Or imagine a situation where state actors suspiciously
alter an institution's internal electoral methods, 287 or the size of a legislative or administrative office, 28 8 once racial minorities assume positions of political power. Or imagine a social practice whereby
minority voters are disenfranchised within the context of the particular political system. 28 9 These situations may very well raise some very
strong presumptions of unconstitutionality. The particular question
in each situation would not be decided by the state's mere use of race,
but its use for harmful purposes. The constitutional violation is not
the use of race, but the intentional action against racial groups for any
reason whatsoever. This is the most sensible reading of Gomillion v.
Lightfoot.
Contrast these cases to fact scenarios where the state, for example, is acting pursuant to its perceived responsibility under section 20
of the Voting Rights Act, or DOJ's commands under section 5.29
Complicating matters, such scenarios might involve the splintering of
actual communities within the given geographic area. 2 91 On these
cases, the state is not acting against racial groups qua race. In fact, the
state is acting, at least in theory, to further these groups' interests.
Without more, these situations should not call for automatic judicial
invalidation. Put more simply, Shaw and its progeny are not Gomillion.
They are not even close. The critics aside,292 it is clear that the state
286 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Of note, the district court
concluded on remand that the at-large system in Mobile was established and maintained "'because of' and not 'in spite of' its dilutive impact on black electoral
strength." Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050, 1075 (S.D. Ala. 1982); see also
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982) (noting the "overwhelming proof" that an
at-large voting system in Georgia was maintained for a discriminatory purpose).
287 See Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
288 Cf Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994) (rejecting argument that size is subject
to a vote dilution challenge under section 2).
289 I refer here to the collection of cases commonly known as the white primary
cases. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
290 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
291 See United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (reapportionment split
the Hasidic community).
292 John Hart Ely has written, for example, that "it is sometimes hard to tell
whether a gerrymander is 'antiminority' or 'prominority,' as in Wright and Carey, [and
that] strikes me as yet another argument for the ultimate suggestion of this Article,
that race be taken out of the process altogether." Ely, supra note 11, at 608 n.2.
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actors in Gomillion had some intentions in mind very different from
those in Shaw. 293 If one does not see it from reading both cases
thoughtfully, there is very little that can be said to help one see it.294
One case is about racial oppression, the other is far from that.2 9 5
CONCLUSION: SAFEGUARDING THE POLITICAL PROCESS

In recent years, commentators have exhorted a much more aggressive judicial posture over the political gerrymandering issue. The
Court itself has taken on such a posture over modern racial gerrymandering claims. This Article explored these many calls to inject the
Court into heated redistricting controversies. To be sure, this Article
agrees with Justice Douglas on the importance of the inquiry about
the nature of redistricting and its effect on the political process. 29 6
This Article takes this view farther back in time, however, and posits
that a judicial response to the gerrymandering question began in earnest with the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr.29 7 In Baker, it was clear
that the Tennessee legislature was simply refusing to redraw its district
lines for no better reason than political self-interest. As such, Baker is
but a direct precursor to Davis v. Bandemer.29 8 In fact, while the rhetoric is different, these cases are but mirror images of one another.
Both cases worry about representation and political losses, while setting a high standard for litigants to meet, in deference of the complexities at issue in the reapportionment field.
293 The debate over the intent standard is both complex and multi-faceted. Its
nuances are outside the scope of this effort, and I address the debate elsewhere. See
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Discrimination as Intent and the Centrality of the Judicial Role
(2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).

294 Unsurprisingly, researchers predominantly conclude that whites and blacks inhabit vastly different opinion worlds. See DONALD KINDER & LYNN SANDERS, DIVIDED BY
COLOR: RACIAL POLrrIcs AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 33 (1997) ("No doubt the most striking feature of public opinion on race is how emphatically black and white Americans
disagree with each other."); J. Morgan Kousser, Shaw v. Reno and the Real World of
Redistricting and Representation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 625, 665-69 (1995) (documenting
opinion chasm between blacks and whites).

295 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the difference
between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat.").
296 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 176 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The
problem of the gerrymander is how to defeat or circumvent the sentiments of the

community. The problem of the law is how to prevent it.").
297 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
298 See Dean Alfange, Jr., Genrymandering and the Constitution:Into the Thorns of the
Thicket at Last, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 175, 188 (noting that the issue in Baker, though
couched in "fairness" rhetoric, was purely political).
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In this vein, the more important question worries about the role
that critics would wish to ascribe to our federal judicial officers. The
constitutional question, after all, is one of judicial intervention and
the existence of manageable standards. On this point, Martin Shapiro
argues, "Gerrymandering is a bad, bad thing. And there is nobody
around to fix it except courts. They may have a lot of trouble doing it,
and it may get them into a lot of trouble, but they must do it anyway
because there is no one else who can." 29 9 A separate position analogizes the redistricting process to a market. On this model, some commentators have much faith in the market's ability to correct itself, 0 0
while others would posit the Court as the institution in charge of en30 1
suring that an "appropriate market in political competition exists."
This Article agrees with these two positions, at least in spirit. It shares
with them a belief in limited court intervention. To declare a matter
justiciable, as in Baker, Bandemer, and Shaw, need not lead to increased
judicial intervention. These cases presented the Court with extreme
facts, thus making judicial intervention easy. This is not to say that all
three cases were properly decided. Rather, the point is that the promise of Baker and the reality of Bandemer point in a flexible and forgiving jurisprudential direction. The same may not be said of Shaw.
Thankfully, as I have argued elsewhere, 30 2 Shaw's time has finally
passed.
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Shapiro, supra note 20, at 251.
See Schuck, supra note 15, at 1337-45.
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 14, at 717.
See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 17, at 310-11.
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